The growth of public sector in Hong Kong. by Cho, Yee Fun. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Economics.
THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC SECTOR IN HONG KONG
by
Cho Yee Fun, Yvonne
submitted in partial fulfillment of






In recent Tear. s due t.o the r. d upsurge of
government expenditure i ni TnanV countries, there has been
renewed interest in the stuzdv of the growth of government
as well as the existence of an endogeriotas governmen
sector.
Hong Kong does provide an interesting case for
the study of government expenditure. Hong Kong has often
been termed a laissez-faire economy with minimal
govermmnent intervention. However, she has also
experienced exponential. grawth in government expenditure,
especially since the 1970s
Actually, Hong Kona is a Colony under thE
aut.boritarian rule from the British Covernment and ther
is, in the strictest sense, no democracy according to the
standards of. Western European Countries and the CTnitec
States. Nevertheless, Hong Kong does allows the rights
of citizenship. For example. there is the freedom of
speech and press, the freedom of religion an
association, the courtis independent and the rule of lai,
is observed. Hence, Hong Kong can as well be describes
as a democracy in the loose sense. However, the coming
of 197 would bring along considerable ch
political. decision making processes as well as in the
government itself. Therefore, systematic understanding
of the main determinants for the growth of the public
sector in Hong Kong would be particularly useful.at this
time
.Empirical estimations indicated that the
concept of an endogenous public sector will. be applicable
to Hong Kong, which means that the Hong Kong public
sector expands systematically to changes in several.
demographic and political variables included in the
stadv. Amongst the stronger explanatory variables are
per capita real income perceived marginal unit price of
government goods and servicest and population. These are
the major factors affecting the citizens' demand for
government goods and services. This result would
indicate that the citizens' preferences will be
recognized and reflected
Moreover, as Hong Kong approaches towards 1997,
there is increasing pressure in Hong Kong for forming a
more democratic government with direct voting
oppor. tunities. The upraise of politicians resulting from
the implementation of a direct voting system would tend
to increase the formation of special interest groups and
upgrade their influential power. Besides the
continuously expanding public payroll would render the
bureaucracy more and more difficult to monitor.
Although the Government have rereatedly
emphasized their policy in limiting the growth and size
of government sector. it would be, doubtful whether this
ilmit can continue to work in the future Special
Administrative Government of. Hong Kong unless there are
written resolutions imposing alimit on the size or
growth of government.
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11 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an upsurge of
interest among fiscal economists in the study of growth
and behaviour of governments. This renewed interest
reflects in part the increasing recognition of a world-
wide tendency for public sector expansions, especially
when the public sectors of advanced industrial countries
grow at dramatically fast rates for the past few years.
The rising trend of government expenditure which is
common among developed and developing countries, have
aroused not only the interest of public finance scholars,
but the government finance practitioners and the general
public as well.
In addition, this renewed interest also
reflects the growing dissatisfaction with previous
economic models, in which public decisions have usually
been treated as exogenous. This is especially true in
many macroeconomic models in which it is assumed
governments can alter the expenditure level and tax rates
at will. Therefore, a series of studies have been
generated recently in analysing and testing whether the
public sector will respond systematically to changes in
one or a set of demographic and political variables,
i.e., to study whether a government expenditure function
exists or not.
However, despite such wide-spread concern, the
analysis of an endogenous public sector are few as
2compared to studies in other public finance literatures,
and they varied significantly in the field and depth of
analysis. Needless to sav, some models are far from
being empirically testable.
Actually, the study of the systematic response
of government has a long history in social sciences. In
as early as 1883, a German economist, Ado] ph Wagner,
evolved a law of increasing state activity in which
government expenditure is hypothesized to rise at a
faster rate than the nation's output. This law was
derived primarily from empirical observations of Western
1
European Countries.
Since then, similar studies have rarely been
done until the turn of the Century. However, even in the
early 1900s, the majority of studies on public sector
expansion were contributed from political theorists, and
emphasis were laid on political more than economic
perception of government behaviour. Hence, various
approaches have been used in studying government
expansion, not only economic approach, but also
political and historical to sociological and
psychological ones.
Actually, the increase in concern as to why
government expenditure grows both in absolute expenditure
level and as a ratio to GDP is due to the important
reason that public sector growth is alleged to have
3undesirable economic consequences.
On the expenditure side, it is sometimes argued
that if current expenditure share of the public sector is
too high, the private sector of the economy would be
squeezed into a position where it has to operate too far
below its productive potential. This is further
supported by the view that the productivity advancement
in the public sector is, more often than not, lagging
behind that of the private sector, hence, the level of
public expenditure would be higher than justifiable by
the public sector activities that are currently provided.
For example, it is suggested that public services would
be over-manned, that transfer programmes rise too rapidly
above its demand, or that the overall redistributive
impact of government activities is unable to justify the
resource flows involved. Besides, rising public
expenditure is also alleged to increased inflation in the
economy.
In addition, large state-run enterprises and
regulatory interventions or other off-budget activities
would also hinder the influence of competitive market
forces on resource allocation in the economy as a whole.
Moreover, there is also increasing concern that the
exponentially rising public expenditure cannot be matched
by a similar rise in tax revenue. It is feared that this
would lead to rising tax levels which is tremendously
unpopular as high levels of taxation would blunt the
4incentives of work, saving and taking risks, or increase
tax evasions and tax avoidance. It is also feared that
prolonged government deficits resulted from non-matching
rise in public expenditure would lead to rising public
debt. This would imply higher real interest rates as
well as crowding-out of private investment and hence
retard growth.
In Hong Kong, it is perhaps obvious that our
government expenditure have also experienced exponential
growth since the 1970s. There is also increasing concern
that our government sector may be increasing too rapidly
that it would easily d easily get out of control.2 Hence, there is
a need for investigating the government expenditure
behaviour of Hong Kong and studying what factors have
contributed to its rapid expansion.
The study will be organized as follows:- Ch.
2 studies in detail the total government expenditure
trend of Hong Kong as well as the trends for various
functional categories. Ch. 3 provides a brief review of
some of the relevant literatures on growth of the public
sector. In doing so, it may be possible to develop an
empirical test on the government expenditure behaviour
that would be suitable for Hong Kong and these would be
dealt with in Ch. 4. The regression results, together
with its implications will be discussed in Ch. 5 and
finally Ch. 6 concludes the study.
52 THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT FXPFNDITURE IN HONG KONG
The main purpose of this chapter is to use a
historical approach in examining the growth of government
expenditure in Hong Kong and to try to explain the
context and changes in government expenditure and its
components at various times during the period under
study.
2.1 Definition of government expenditure
In Hong Kong, it is inadequate to examine
government expenditure by merely studying the government
general revenue account. It is the main operating
account dealing with government's own departmental
expenditure. It is designed to meet administration
rather than economic analysis purposes. In order to
examine the total influence of public sector on the
economy, the government consolidated account expenditure
is used.
The consolidated account comprises all
recurrent and capital expenditure charged to the general
revenue account, as well as expenditure incurred by the
Urban Council, the Housing Authority and other special
funds such as the Development Loan Fund, Home Ownership
Fund, Student Loan Fund, Capital Works Reserve Fund and
the Lotteries Fund. The.spending of these funds
represent an important part of government expenditure for
6development and welfare purposes. Hence, it would be
more appropriate to include these as government
expenditure.
Although quite a lot of studies has been done
on public expenditure analysis, there has been no
uniformity as to a generally accepted definition of
government expenditure, explicitly stating which items
are to be considered. Besides, some government
expenditures are :implicit in nature which should also be
included in government expenditure estimate to arrive at
a more accurate measure. These include the implicit
subsidy of low rent for public housing by the Housing
Authority and the resettlement department, as well as the
low interest rate charged on loans for housing and
3
education in the development loan fund. However, due to
the non-availability of the relevant statistics, it may
be very difficult to calculate the value for these
implicit subsidies.
As the consolidated account expenditure series
published by the government are available for the years
1960/61 onwards, it seems more reasonable to use this
series in the following analysis.
2.2 Characteristics of the trend of government
expenditure in Hone. Kong
Government expenditure has teen growing rapidlv
7ever since Mav, 1946, when Britain.resumes its
governmental control in Hong Kong after the Second World
War. Total government expenditure has been increasing.
swiftly and steadily upwards from 116 million. in 1946/47
to well. over 2.5 billion in the early 1970s. The figure
then move exponentially upwards to the recent 53 billion
in 1987/88 which is over 460 times compared with the
1946/47 figure (Table 2.1).. This represents a compound
rate of 16° growth per annum.
However f a comparison of nominal values for
such a long period is not very meaningful. The time
series starting from 1946/47 onwards can be roughly




from 1982/83 to presentto)
2.2.1 From 1946/47 to 1964/65
Starting from the post-war period until. the
early 1960s, government expenditure rose steadily at an
average rate of approximately 1210 per annum in real
terms.
During the early post-war years, i.e. 1946/47
to 1949/50, it can be observed from Table 2.1 that the
share of government expenditure in GDP was already over
8°. This is because of the extensive redevelopment and
reconstruction work done after World War II. Afterwards,
the share rose steadily from 1096 in 1952/5' to as high as
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1. All figures are on fiscal year basis, i.e. beginning
from April, 1 of each year to March, 31 of the
following year.
9Table 2.1 (Con+ t)
Notes:
Consolidated government expenditure comprises all
expenditure charged to the General Revenue Account,
expenditure by the Urban Council, the Housing
Authority and the Regional Council (from 1986/86
onwards), as well as expenditure financed by the
Development Loan Fund, Capital Works Reserve Fund,
Home Ownership Fund, Student Loan Fund and the
Lotteries Fund.
3. Figures are derived by deflating Total Expenditure at
Current Prices with the Government Price Deflator in
Appendix Table IT.
4. Growth rates are derived from Total Expenditure at
1980 Prices.
5. Total Expenditure to GDP Ratios are derived by
dividing Total Expenditure at Current Prices with GDP
at Current Market Prices of the same year (Data for
GDP are tabulated in Table 2.2)
n.a.-- Not available.
Sources:
-For Total- Expenditure at--Cur.rent. Prices:-
For 1946/47-1959/60: Ho, C .Y., The Fiscal Svstem of
Hong Kong, London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1979f P.19, Table
1.4 For 1960/61-1984/85: Government Secretariat,
Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, Hong Kong
Government Printer, various issues For 1985/86-
1987/88: Legislative Council, The 1989-90 Budget
Speeclh, by the Financial ,Secretary, Hong Kong
Government Printer, P.18, Appendix B, Table 1.
10
17° in 1960/61.
During the early 1950s, the Korean War and
trade embargo from the United States had deprived Hong
Kong from the prosperous entrepot trade. It resulted not
only in a sharp decline in trade volume but also a drop
in GDP by 79 in 1952. As government expenditure continued
to rose steadily during this period, the share of
expenditure/GDP rose.
The colony's flexibility was appreciated for
having made a rapid switch towards industrialization.
Hong Kong started to develop her manufacturing industry
after the collapse in the entrepot trade. As a result,
the growth of GDP rose from 0.9 o to 21.9 a towards the early
1960s. (Refer Table 2.2). Government expenditure growth
lagged behind GDP growth and hence, the share of
expenditure/GDP remained at around 16%.
2.2.2 From 1965/66 to 1974/75
The period between 1965/66 and 1969/70 marked
the first of the two sluggish periods that Hong Kong
government ever experienced. Government expenditure
increased by less than 2% per annum on average.
Actually, expenditure declined by 3% in 1967/68. during
this period, two significant events struck Hong Kong.
One was the banking crisis which occurred in 1965 and
lasted for more than a year. The banking crisis was


















































































































































































































































































For GDP at current, market prices :
For 194748-196061 : Ho, C.Y., The Fiscal System
Hong Kong, op. clt.f P.169, Table SI; For 196161
198788: Census and Statistics Department., Estimate
of GDP. Honq Konq Government. Printer, various issues
Notes :
1. GDP at Current Market Prices: figures from Estimate
of GDP are in calendar year basis. They are converte
t.o fiscal year basis on the assumption that GDP wa
prodiced evenly throughout the year. Figures from H
are in fiscal year basis already and need no furthe
adjustments.
2. GDP at Constant. 1980 Prices are derived by deflatinc
GDP at Current. Prices with the GDP Deflator froir
AnnpnrH v Tab!p TT.
3. Growth rates of Real GDP are derived from GDP a1
rrmQf;=mf 1 QftO Pri
4. Per Capita GDP at Current Market Prices are derived b
dividing GDP at. Current Market Prices with Total Mid
voar Prniil atinn finnrpc! in Annpndiy Tahl P TTT -
5. Per Capita GDP at 1980 Prices are derived by deflatin
Per Capita GDP at Current Market Prices using GD
deflator as in 2.
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followed immediately by a civil riot in 1967. There was
a sudden drop in government revenue in 1965/66 mainly as
a result of the decrease in revenue from land sales and
stamp duty from HK$133 to HK$73 and from HK$75 to HK$62
respectively between 1964/65 and 1965/66. As a result, a
budget deficit occurred in the same year.
In facing a budget deficit in 1965/66, in
order to prevent further deficits in the following years,
government had exercised expenditure cuts without raising
taxes. This has resulted in the drop of 3% in government
expenditure in 1967/68. One point to note is that during
this period, the disturbances in the economy did not seem
to step up government expenditure as the displacement
effect would predict.
While growth of government expenditure was
slowed down, due to the reasons given above, it lagged
behind the growth of GDP, resulting in a descending
expenditure/GDP ratio for this. period. The
expenditure/GDP ratio fell from 16% in 1965/66 to 11% in
1969/70.
2.2.3 From 1975/76 to 1981/82
1975/76 started another period of sluggish
growth. The period of fall was shorter, but with greater
magnitude. Government expenditure fell by 4% in 1975/76,
but quickly recovering in 1976/77. Beside the oil price
14
crisis and the world recession, Hong Kong also suffered
from the stock market collapse in 1974. The growth of
GDP was slowed down. As government revenue will be more
responsive to income changes than government expenditure
in the short term, hence, growth of revenue will lag
behind that of expenditure. 5 As a result, a budget
deficit occurred in 1974/75. The response of the
government in face of the deficit was to cut expenditure
in 1975/76 by postponing some of the public works
projects on hand. In this way, the expenditure/GDP ratio
declined.
The economy soon recovered from the recession.
GDP rose swiftly from 1976/77 onwards. The government
had taken this time to make up for the public works
postponed due to the 1975 budget cut. Hence, government
expenditure also resumed its rapid growth.
Resides, the booming of the real-estate market
in the late 1970s has led to a sudden upsurge of revenue
to the government, especially in revenues from land sales
and stamp duty (rose by more than 3 times and twice
respectively between 1979/80 and 1980/81). Consequently,
government was capable of spending more generously,
especially in community services. (Community services
between 1979/80 and 1981/82 increased by more than 5096
per annum on average.)
The cirowth of government expenditure increased
15
with an average rate of 179s per annum between 1977/78 and
1981/82, while GDP only increased by 10% on average.
Hence, the ratio of expenditure/GDP accelerated.
2.2.4 From 1982/83 to present
The upsurge of revenue from land sales could
not keep up in the early 1980s. The real-estate market
collapsed in 1982 due to the general loss of confidence
in Hong Kong's future-- entailed by the 1997 problem.
The revenue from land sales dropped by half in 1982/83.
This created a problem to the government because most of
public works projects incurred large amount of sinking
fund which could not he recovered adequately in a short
time. The concurrent occurrence of sustained spending
and declined revenue has resulted in a deficit in the
government budget.
Although expenditure could not be cut
immediately, the government managed to slow down
expenditure growth from 13% in 1982/83 to 3% in 1983/84,
and decreased expenditure by 3% in the following year.
This slowing down in expenditure growth had resulted in a
declining expenditure/GDP ratio.
After two years of negotiations, the british
and P.R.C. governments finally initiated the Sino-British
joint declaration on september,1984. Confidence in Hong
Kong was then restored and the real-estate business
resumed its prosperity. As revenue from land sales rose
again from 1984/85 onwards, budget surplus could finally
be resumed in 1985/86.
16
2.3 Comnarisorn of the size of Dublic sector
Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP
is much lower in Hong Kong as compared to the
industrialized countries. Even if comparison is made
with Asian countries, the ratio of Hong Kong is still
lower. It seems more reasonable to compare the share of
government expenditure with Singapore, Taiwan and S.
Korea, as these countries have undergone similar
development process and achieved similar levels of
economic development. It can be seen that government
sector in Hong Kong is the smallest amongst the four
places while Singapore is the largest. Actually, for
the countries listed, only the Philippines and Thailand
had smaller expenditure/ GDP ratio than Hong Kong.(Table2.,}
Hong Kong, having a comparatively small public
sector, can often be termed the last stronghold of Adam
smith. Public policy in Hong Kong has often prompted
criticism from various people mainly as too conservative
and cautious. Hong Kong's fiscal budget is typical of
low level of government expenditure, low tax rate and
chronic surplus budget with large reserves.
Hong Kong has one of the freeest economic
systems in the world, and the declared economic
philosophy of the government is 'positive non-
6
interventionism'. Besides, back to the early years,
government officials had repeatedly rejected regulatory
Table 2.3 A comparison of government expenditure as a
percentage of GDP for selected countries
(in percentages)
Countrv Years














































































































For OECD Countries : from Mueller, D.C., The growth of
government : A public choice perspective, I.M.F.
Staff Papers, Mar 1987, p.117, Table 2?
For Developing Asian Countries : from United Nations,
Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific.
1982, United Nations Publication, Feb 1983 , P.103,
Table II.1.
functions of the budget, in the Kevnesian manner. Fo
example, in the 1964 Budget Speech, Sir J oh:
Cowperthwait.e had mentioned that :
Economists of the Modern School will no doubt, protest
that I have said nothing of the use of budget deficits or
surpluses for the control of the economy in general. I
doubt if much techniques would ever be „appropr i a t. e in
Hong Kong's exposed economic position.
Similar statements have continuously been made b
8
government officials.
There are obvious reasons why government would
like to keep the public sector small. Firstly, Hong Kong
is a small open economy relying mainly on international
trade. With limited land and scarce resources, Hong Kong
has to depend mostly on import of foodstuffs and other
raw materials. Hence, the propensity to import for Hong
9
Kong is high. Due to the high propensity of import, the
multiplier effects of autonomous spending will become
relatively small. This would result in the actual
compensatory effects of fiscal policy being smaller than
that perceived, i.e. the effectiveness of fiscal policy
would be much reduced due to trade leakages, especially
10
for highly open economies.
Secondly, the government expenditure in Hong
Kong is mainly financed by tax or land sales, which form
the majority of Hong Kong tax revenue. As revenue from
land sales is pro-cyclical in nature, the revenue stream
would be quite unstable and would fluctuate with economic
r.nnditions, hence arowth of the public sector, with
19
increasing government expenditure, would logically imply
increases in tax base. Hong Kong has often been termed a
'tax-haven' and this has attracted a large amount of
investments to Hong Kong. However, the raising of tax
rates, if go beyond the acceptable level, would induce
capital and labour to move out of Hong Kong, as there is
minimum control on the mobility of factors in Hong Kong.
Mr. Haddon-Cave, the former financial
secretary (for the period 1971 /72 to 1981/82), has
realized the need for setting an upper ceiling for
expenditure/ GDP ratio in Hong Kong in 1976 when
government expenditure was expected to move continuously
11
upwards in the following years. From 1979/80 onwards,
the relative size of the public sector did increased
swiftly and reached approximately 19% in 1982/83.
However, after 1982/83, the ratio of expenditure/ GDP
begins to fall back to around 16% as a result of the 1997
crisis. Besides, the present financial secretary, Mr. P.
Jacobs, has renewed the vigilance in the relative size of
public sector.
In Hong. Kong,_ however, we_ have_ sought to contain the
relative size of the public sector by limiting
expenditure growth to within the trend growth rate e of the
economy. This remains our guiding principle.
2.4 The Government Budget
One interesting point to note is that during
the 40 years of budgeting, government had incurred only
20
seven deficits. They are in 1946/47, 1959/64, 1965/66,
1974/75 and 1982/83-1984/85 (Table 2.4). The 1946/47
budget deficit was mainly the result of vast rebuilding
and reconstruction activities after the Second World War.
These activities had taken up a large amount of
government expenditure with a deficit resulted. The
1959/60 deficit was due to the insufficiency in revenue
increase over expenditure increases during the 1958 trade
recession. The 1965/66 deficit was the result of banking
crisis and civil riots while the 1974/75 deficit was
due to the world recession and collapse of Hong Kong
stock market as mentioned in 2.2.
The most persistent budget deficit, also with
the greatest magnitude, occurred from 1982/83 to 1984/85,
lasting for three years' time. This is the. longest
period of deficit ever experienced. The reason for this
was due to the 1997 Problem. Not until the Problem was
finally solved in 1984, the general loss of confidence
among Hong Kong citizens and overseas investors had
resulted in a large reduction in revenue during this
period, and budget deficit occurred as a result.
It is obvious that the budget deficits are
discrete and temporary. in nature, usually occurred for
just one year's time, with the longest lasting for three
years. This is because each time when a budget deficit
occurred, government could quickly react by cutting or
decreasing government expenditure on the following year.
21
Table 2.4 General Revenue Account-- Revenue, Expenditure
and Budget Surplus or Deficit, 1946/47-
1 9R7 /RR
Surplus/
Year Revenue Expenditure Deficit











































Notes: All figures are at current prices.
* being revised estimates.
Sources:
For 1946/47: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong
Statistics, 1947-1967, Hong Kong Government Printer
For 1947/48-1987/88: Government Secretariat, Estimates of
Revenue and Expenditure, Hong, Kong Government Printer,
various issues.
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Besides, the financial secretary usually errs as a rule,
perhaps on the side of caution, in under-estimating
government revenue and over-estimating government
expenditure. Hence, the government budget always have
its surplus a lot more than'that estimated.
2.5 Structure of Government Expenditure in Functional
Categories
Government expenditure in the Consolidated
Account can be broadly classified into four main
functional categories, namely,
(1) General services (2) Economic services
(3) Community services and (4) Social services.
Most of general service are truly public
goods, e.g. administration services defense, law and
order, etc. as they would bring indivisible benefits to
the community as a whole. Included in the economic
service are expenditure on agriculture, fisheries, trade
and industry, aviation, shipping, telecommunication,
post, etc. and subventions to economic agencies such as
the Trade Development Council and the Hong Kong
Table 2.5 GOVERNMENT CONSOLIDATED EXPENDITURE BY FUNCTION,
















































































































































































































Note : All figures are given at current prices and on fiscal year
basis.
Sources : For 194950 - 195960 : G.Y. Ho, The Fiscal system of Hong
Kong, op. cit.,p.33, Table 2.5;
For 196061 - 1984S5 : Government secretariat, Estimates
of Revenue and Expenditure, H.K. Government Printer, vari¬
olar issues;
For 198586 - 1987So : Government Information services,
Hong Kong Annual Report, H.K. Government Printer, various
issues.
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Productive ty Council. The majority of spending in
community service is for the cost of road development and
land reclamation. These would improve the economic and
business environment of the economy. Besides, community
service also includes the provision of water supply both
for domestic and industrial uses, and the provision of
urban services like markets, sanitary, as well as fire
services, preservation of life and properties.
Social services expenditure can be divided into
5 sub-categories: The provision of education is mainly
in the form of subsidies and loans to government assisted
schools and the University and Polytechnic Grant
Committee. The expenditure of Medical and Health
Department and grants and subsidies to charitable
organizations which provide medical and health services
are included in medical and health category. Housing
spending is mainly for providing low rent for public
housing and low interest on loans for private developers.
Social welfare expenditure represents mostly expenditure
of Social Welfare Department and subventions to voluntary
and charitable welfare organizations. Labour service
generally consists of only around 0.7% of social service
expenditure and is rather insignificant as compared with
the other sub-categories.
It is very obvious, and has already been
pointed out by various studies on public expenditure that
social service expenditure maintained the highest. growth
25
for the last 40 years, increasing by a compound annual
rate of 13% in real terms from 1949/50 to 1984/85.
Community service achieved the second highest growth with
11°s rise per annum. General service increased steadily
with a rate of 7% per annum, lower than the 9% compound
annual growth rate of total real expenditure. Economic
service had the slowest growth rate compared with the
other services as well as far below that of total real
expenditure. The increase was only 5% per annum.
The importance of social service and community
service are not only reflected in the growth rate, but
also reflected in their share in total expenditure. The
share of social services in total expenditure increased
from 16.7% in 1949/50 to 44.9% in 1984/85, representing
2.7 times rise. The share of community service rose from
15.2% to 24.0% (i. e. 1.6 times rise). However, share of
general service decreased from 54.4% to 27.7% and share
of economic service dropped from 13.7% to 3.4%. The
increasing share of social services in total expenditure
is not surprising as this also happens to the
international trend in general. As social services like
education and medical services are goods of relatively
more private nature as compared with the more public
nature of -general services-,-- hence, when the-- society
becomes more affluent, there would be a tendency for
increase in social service demanded.
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3 TTNFnR T nT THEROWTH OF PUBLIC SECTOR
In the last chapter, the trend for government
expenditure had been described in detail. Government
expenditure has grown rapidly through the years.
However, why has it grown in such ways as has been
described previously? In this chapter, some relevant
theories on the size and growth of government is
reviewed in an attempt that these theoretical framework
would help to explain the timing and nature of government
expenditure.
3.1 Major Developments in Models of Public Expansion
There is no single widely accepted theory of
government expenditure in the Public Finance Literature.
Despite the wide-spread concern in the study of
government behaviour and growth in recent years, analysis
varied significantly in the field of approach and depth
of their study. For example, in the papers of
Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Bergstrom and
Goodman (1973) and Bo rcherding(1977), analysis were based
on purely economic approach using demand and supply
conditions for a market of public goods in Downs (1957),
Orzechowskv (1977), political aspects of government were
emphasized. In Lindbeck (1985) and Wildavsky (1985),
expenditure growth is explained in a cultural perspective
while Peacock and Wiseman (1967) and North (1985) views
.government expenditure using a historical approach.
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Many of these literature concentrated on cross-
sectional analysis between different government or
different localities. Some studies, e.g. Borcherding
(1985) analyze government expenditure growth through
time. Moreover, models like Borcherding and Deacon
(1972), Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) are based on formal
empirical framework, while some models e.g. Lindbeck
(1985) and Wildawskv (1985) are difficult to be tested
empirically.
Nevertheless: the study of the systematic
response of government has a long history. In as early
as 1883, a German economist, Adolph Wagner, evolved a
law of increasing state activity. Since then, similar
studies have rarely been done until the turn of the
Century. However, even in the early 1900s, the majority
of studies on public sector expansion were contributed
from political theorists, and emphasis had been laid on
political rather than economic perception of government
behaviour. Hence, differences in the development of
appr-caches -have -been resulted- i-n- the -study -of government
expansion as mentioned above.
3.1.E Wagner's Law
One of the earliest attempts to explain the
trend of public expenditure growth was A. Wagner. He
proposed the law of increasing-state activity in which
.government expenditure is hypothesized to rise at a
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faster rate than the nation's output. This law was
derived primarily from empirical observations of western
European Countries. The argument was that social
progress in an economy would bring along with it the
increase in state act 13
ivity. This is because firstly,
as an economy develops, it brings along increase in
division of labour, and economic life would become more
and more complex. Hence, the causes of friction would
rise. In order to maintain order and have an efficient
economy, the state requires more resources on police and
legal services.
In addition, economic progress induces the
state to participate more in production, especially in
those industries where technical conditions favors
monopoly. This is because the introduction of new
technology would require large amount of capital in
production. This could better be provided by public
corporations according to Wagner.
There would, however, be another explanation as
mentioned by North (1985) He cited Kau and Rubin
(1981) 's test on the hypothesis that:
the growth of government has come about because. e..
there have been changes in production technology
has indirectly led to an increase in the proportion of
income which is subject to taxation.
Moreover, increasing state activity in fields
like education and health would usually be resulted
because public evaluation often equates the benefits of
29
the service to the amount provided. Hence, these
services are more susceptible to public pressure. As a
result, state activity would be increased with
increasing economic progress.
3.1.2 Displacement Concentration Hypothesis
Peacock and Wiseman (1967) offered anotner
explanation which concerned the fluctuation of government
expenditure over time. They used a historical mode of
analysis which focused specific historical events as the
primary causes of expenditure growth. They hypothesized
that the rise in government expenditure, especially swift
and discrete rises, were due to the displacement
effect. Public decisions about the level of government
expenditure are assumed to be made through the ballot box
or other media. They then assumed that tax payment by
the citizens need not be equated with the benefits
received. People would consider the notion of acceptable
tax burden more than the desirability of expenditure
increase. Hence, government expenditure can be increased
easily up to the point where tax revenue can be expanded
because of growing income, without raising the tax rates
and the level of acceptable tax burden. Further increase
in expenditure is unlikely beyond this point.
It was proposed that the trade-off between
tolerable levels of taxation and desirable level of
expenditure can be narrowed during large-scale social
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disturbances such as wars, riots, world recessions, etc.
Government expenditure would be displaced upwards as a
result of social disturbances. This was because,
firstly, the acceptance effect, that the crisis would
.lead people to increase the tolerable level of taxation
by accepting a higher tax rate. Secondly, it was due to
the inspection effect, that crisis forced people to the
attention of government problems and hence, increase the
desirable level of expenditure. Thirdly, as the public
sector was increased, it would be easier for the
bureaucracy to asset its interest in expanding the level
of government expenditure. These effects would persist
even after the crisis was relieved. Besides, due to high
inertia of the public in changing the acceptable level
of taxation and desirable spending level, public
expenditure would remain more or less as a constant
proportion of national income during peacetime.
This was what has been actually observed when
Peacock and Wiseman studied the government expenditure of
U.K. It indicated that government expenditure was raised
rapidly during war time and subsequently forming a
plateau after the war years, and the level of plateau
would be substantially above that of pre-war years. This
result was especially significant for the two World Wars,
but less significant for the Great Depression and the
Korean War. However, the theory did not seem to be able
to explain the government expenditure increases during
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the 70s and 80s where social disturbances seems
unobservable.
3.1.3 Public Choice Approach
During the past two or three decades, vast
amount of studies have been done on government expansion
using the public choice approach. This approach
concerns the application of the theory of choice to human
and political behaviour. These studies are based on
individual behaviour, assuming that the people will
behave rationally by maximizing their utilities in
political activities. That is, politicians will maximize
their votes in a democracy while citizens will maximize
their real income stream by casting votes to the
politician who promised the best package of benefits.
Besides, bureaucrats maximize their satisfaction in such
considerations as salary, power, prestige, promotion,
large offices, etc.
Two characteristic features are present in
these public choice approaches. One is that it
incorporates the institutional and constitutional
practices in which individual preferences are translated
into public decisions. The other is that altruism and
other personal characteristics can also be entered into
the model. However, such models might have the problem
of over-simplification and there is also the
uncertainties and ignorance involved in the magnitude and
effects of the parameters in various maximization
objectives. These public choice models will be
considered in the following sections.
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3.2 The Growth of Government in a Public Choice
Perspective
In general, explanations for why government
grow mainly stem from the question of why government
exists. Most theories fall into two fundamental concepts
of the state:
{I) Citizens- over- state or
(II) State- over- citizens.
According to (I), the state's role is to carry
out the will of the people and to transform individual
preferences into political outcomes. The ultimate
authority lies with the citizens. Based on this concept,
three major types of explanations concerning public
expenditure growth have been proposed:
(1) Provider of public goods and eliminator of
externalities
(2) Redistributor of income and wealth
(3) Interest group influences
According to (II), government policies are
reflections of the preferences of political leaders and
bureaucrats rather than those of individual citizens.
The citizens usually have loose control over government.
Hence, bureaucrats and legislators can pursue their own





A multiplicity of hypothesis applying to
different concepts have been proposed. It would be very
difficult to draw dividing lines between different
theories of government growth as some hypothesis have
included a combination of two or more of the above
explanatory categories.
3.2.1 Government as provider of public goods and
eliminator of externalities:
The traditional discussion of the role or
government views it as a provider of public goods, an
institution that is needed to secure the efficient
allocation of resources in the economy. The difference
between public and private goods is that the former
cannot be provided through the market due to i) the non-
rival and non-exclusive nature of public goods ii)
market failures iii) the free-rider problem iv) the
existence of positive or negative externalities v)
production with increasing returns-to-scale, and vi)
'Merit' goods. Under these circumstances, private
provision would become. inefficient. Hence government is
needed to guide the economy to an efficient allocation of
resources. This also implies the underlying assumption
that government has perfect knowledge about the private
14
economy.
Assuming that the allocation function is the
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main function of the government, models generally treat
government expenditure as an outcome of a market for
government services, i.e. expenditure is determined by
the demand and cost conditions for publicly provided
goods. Here, it is implicitly assumed that government is
similar to a private firm under perfectly competitive
situation. Yet, government is different from a
competitive firm in the private sector in that, firstly,
the government is a monopoly but she acts like a
competitive firm under the assumption of perfect
information, as she cannot gain monopoly profit by
charging a monopoly price by restricting output.
(instead, she has to charge marginal unit price and the
supply schedule is perfectly elastic.) Secondly, each
buyer in the private market is able to determine
independently whether to buy the good or not and the
amount of goods required, but for public goods, everyone
has to be involved in its consumption whether one wants
it or not.
Consider an economy in which each citizen is
hypothesized to have a demand for public goods as a
function of his income and the price he faces for the
public good. The government is assumed to be a direct
democracy and the political framework consists of a
voting system where all citizens vote and decisions are
determined by simple majority rule. Citizens use this
system to vote on a single issue-- the level of
government expenditure or government taxes and the
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voters' preferences are single-peaked. Using the median
voter model in which the median voter is the decisive
voter, demand for public goods can be postulated as a
function characteristic of that of the median voter.
Therefore, theorists hypothesized that government expand
in direct response to the demand of citizens. Concerning
this theory, Borcherding has contributed several studies
on U.S. data. Other scholars like Deacon, Bergstrom and
Goodman had also analysed the theory with formal
15
statistical models.
In general, models postulated that government
expenditure is a function of income, price and
population, as well as other variables like urbanization
and population density, etc. In notation, it is:
where G denotes the total government expenditure, Y
denotes income, P is the relative price of government to
private goods, N is population and Z is a rag-bag of all
other variables. Most of the estimation focused on
cross-sectional analysis of states and localities.
3.2.2 Governnent as redistributor of income and wealth:
A more positive theory of government discusses
the role of government to perform the distribution
function, that it is needed to assure an economy will
conform with a just state of distribution.
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It is obvious that the transfer component of
government expenditure in many countries have been
growing much faster than other components. Besides,
government expenditure, in certain ways, will have a
redistributive effect, whether intended or not.
Therefore, some writers consider this category as the
main reason for government expansion.
Actually, the introduction of a voting system
into the government decision making process has already
led to redistribution as the majority voting rule allows
the majority to shift disproportionate share of taxes to
the minority and redistribute income towards themselves.
Some recent studies seek to explain growth or
size of government by assuming that all government
activities involve redistribution only, i.e. they are
purely 'private'. Examples of these include Meltzer and
Richard (1984), Lindbeck (1985), Peltzman (1986).
According to Meltzer and Richard,
redistribution was assumed the only function of
government. Budget was balanced by financing
redistribution (by means of per capita lump-sum grants)
with proportional income tax, and redistribution was
mainly from rich to poor. Their model differs from those
in 3.2.1 in that, here, utility is not only a function-of
consumption, but also leisure. Income is a reflection of
the productivity factor of each individual. They also
include the feedback effect of income on consumption by
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assuming that consumption depends on disposable income.
The problem then narrows down to a maximization
problem in which each individual maximizes a utility
function of consumption and leisure, and is subject to a
.choice of how much work he would like to do. Two
important implications from the model were:
(i) increase suffrage would increase the number of
voters whose productivity factor and income are less than
the original median. The new median voter, who will have
a lower productivity factor and income level, would
prefer to choose a higher taxing rate, hence
redistributive expenditure would increase and (ii)
higher inequality between citizens would mean that the
new median voter would have a lower income and lower
productivity factor than the original, hence having
.similar effects as in (i).
Empirical test of Meltzer and Richard was done
on the relationship between the skewness of income
distribution (i.e. the ratio of median income to average
income), and the level of government redistribution
expenditure. Results indicated that a positive
relationship exists between the two variables. However,
they may not be significant enough to arouse much
interest. This may be due to the fact that the
relationship between income skewness and government
expenditure as considered by them was actually an
approximation of a non-linear relationship.
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3.2.3 Interest group influence
The incorporation of political institutions and
public decision processes into the minimal government
complicates the simple demand problem. Besides the
variables mentioned above, the model should be extended
to include other factors concerning political
institutions. These other factors not captured above
may also have considerable effect on the growth of public
spending. The most obvious one is the effect of interest
groups on government expenditure growth.
Interest groups are now playing a more and more
important role as political and economic agents in the
economy. They can influence the behaviour of voters, the
implementation of legislation and the operation of
bureaucracy as well. How do interest groups come about?
The most direct idea that would come into mind
is the solidarity of interest to further their common
interest. As Borcherding mentioned,
"Groups organized along special interest: consumer or
producer class lines are assumed to have lower costs of
getting together' politically than less bcohesive larger
groups of citizens that are exploited."16
The advantages of citizens grouping together
would be, besides the existence of scale economies in
decreasing the cost of achieving special goals or rent-
seeking activities, will also enhance bargaining power.
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Another important element came from
technological advancement and industrialization. They
increase the specialization and division of labour in the
economy. This would, not only reduce the cost of
production, but also raise business transaction costs,
enhancing the forming of coalitions to press government
to relieve them from such costs. Besides, the increase
in specialization would also increase the specificity of
issues around which interest groups can be organized, and
decrease the cost of communications, making organization
and maintenance of interest groups less costly.
Moreover, competition by vote-maximizing
politicians for more influences in the political system
leads them to seek out special interest groups and to
offer them subsidies in return for their votes. These
vote-gathering activities of politicians induces rent-
seeking citizens to form interest groups which, as
mentioned above, are more politically identifiable than
the non-coerced individuals. In addition, interest
groups formation will also prevent unwanted recipients
out of their coalitions and hence reduce 'free-riders' or
'cheap-riders' from gaining benefits.
In view of the significance of interest groups,
not many investigations have been carried out on -growth
and formation of interest groups. Exceptions include
Murrell (1984), Becker (1985) and Lindbeck (1985).
Becker modeled an equilibrium where interest groups
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pressures would be bal-anced and government becomes larger
than it would be without interest groups. Murrell
empirically estimated the effect of various demographic,
political and sociological factors which favor the
formation of interest groups. Lindbeck noted that
interest groups with lower cost (per member) for
organizing and propagandizing are likely to be more
efficient and successful. Moreover, those with
homogeneity of interest (especially one-issue groups) are
more easily identifiable by vote-gathering politicians,
hence will also be more successful.
These studies model public decisions in a
democratic government in terms of a 'core' of interest
groups adhering to the political parties on similar
ideological grounds. It is not in terms of a vast
spectrum of individual voters with different preferences
in which the median voter is decisive. The vote-
maximizing politicians, in order to seek more political
support, will propose those policies that would benefit
the adhered interest groups as well as minimize the
perceived negative impacts due to increased taxes on the
other groups. This might involve the transfer of tax
burden to the non-coerced population, or the use of
deficit financing which leave the pay-off burden to the
future generations.
Most of these studies have indicated that
rising power of interest group causes government growth.
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Yet, rigorous studies that actually model. the mechanism
of how interest groups influence the size of government
expenditure or stimulate or hinder expenditure growth can
rarely be found.
3.3.4 Bureaucratic power
It has been argued in previous sections that a
rising share of government expenditure would be due to a
response for increased demand by the citizens-- either
on provision of goods and services, or on redistribution
of wealth and the citizens may act alone or form
coalitions, i.e. interest groups to reflect their
preferences and influence government decisions. So far,
there has been an implicit assumption for a passive
supply response to the demands of citizens by the
government. Nevertheless, a rising share of government
expenditure may also serve as a reflection of the
maximization behaviour of those officials who work in the
government, i.e. the bureaucrats. Theories generally
postulate that the bureaucracy would propose a budget
that is greater than the minimum expenditure for
government goods demanded. Hence, government expenditure
is larger than it should be. This leads us to the
question of why bureaucrats want larger budgets. Models
explaining this are varied and statistical evidence is
rare.
Niskanen and several other writers 11Ke M1gue
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and Belanger, Staaf, Parkinson, based the study of
bureaucratic behaviour on utility maximization models 17
Bureaucrats are postulated to be utility maximizers.
They are assumed to have monopoly power over the supply
of government goods and can exercise their preferences
easily. Bureaucratic utility is assumed to be a
monotonic function of either total output, staff size or
fiscal residuum (i.e. the amount of budget surplus) or
their combinations, subject to the constraint that median
voter's demand must be satisfied and all costs must be
fully covered. It has been thought that rewards such as
higher salary, larger offices, power, security and the
likelihood of promotion, etc. to bureaucrats would rise
along with more output, staff and residuum of government.
The reason that this maximization behaviour of
bureaucrats could not be well monitored by the citizens
may be because of the lack of information on the workings
of bureaucracy,' and citizens may not be interested in
securing more information on this.
Concerning empirical evidence, one study by
Staaf (1977) had shown that bureaucrat's pay, power and
prestige are positively related to how large the budget
was. Orzechowsky (1977) tried to test empirically the
prediction power of Niskanen's and several similar models
on bureaucratic behaviour as well as to compare input
utilization between public and private institution.
Results obtained using data on public colleges and
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universities shown that public institutions use labour-
biased technique of production and have a strong
inclination to overstaff. It was also found that public
institutions have slow or negative productivity growth
and they operate at higher costs than private
alternatives. This also suggested the method of
production in public institution would be less efficient
than private alternatives.
3.3.5 Fiscal illusion
The fiscal illusion explanation for government
expansion hypothesize that the legislature can deceive
the citizens on the true size of government. It assumes
that legislature can increase the tax-cost of citizens in
such ways that they do not aware of the increased tax
paid. If the citizens underestimate the true tax-cost of
government expenditure programmes, the legislature can
increase the size of government.
Oates (1985) proposed several causes of fiscal
illusion which includes increase complexity of the tax
systems, more elastic tax structures and government
borrowings, etc.
Concerning the empirical literature in fiscal
illision Pommerehne and Schneider (1985) postulated
that the degree of under-estimation of the tax rate will
increase with the degree of complexity of the tax system.
Estimation was done on local public spending for 110
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Swiss-cities. It was found empirically that a positive
correlation relationship exists between the level of
government expenditure and tax complexity.
However, Greene and Munley (1987) performed
similar analysis on U.S. data by using Wagner (1976)'s
model, but they found no correlation between tax
complexity and government expenditure.
As Borcherding (1985) has noted, No one has
yet made a tight case for a biased and growing fiscal
illusion. The lack of strong empirical support for the
fiscal illusion hypothesis may be because the phenomenon
had been defined vaguely and there had been no rigorous
model of fiscal illusion in the literature. Besides,
that fiscal illusion may not permanently impair voter's
vision as suggested by Mueller (1987) might imply the
insignificance of the hypothesis in the long run.
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4 FORMATION OF THE MODEL FOR THIS STUDY
The previous chapter has provided the
theoretical basis on which an empirical study on growth
of government expenditure in Hong Kong can be formulated.
Considerable variations in the literature can be observed
and no consensus has been arrived as to a clear cut
explanation of government expansion. Among the many
factors proposed, the hypothesis that increase in
government expenditure occurs as income rises has been
more widely accepted and empirically verified. In the
present study, this hypothesis will be tested, with the
inclusion of several other prominent variables from the
public choice literature as one single factor may not
fully explain the trend of government expansion. It is
assumed that the impact of these factors included are
additive and may lead us to a better picture of
government expansion.
4.1 Tnrnme Elasticity Estimation for Government
Expenditure in Hong Kong
There had been a lot of studies on government
expenditure for Hong Kong. Yet studies that treat
government expenditure explicitly as being endogenous to
other variables would be relatively few. H.C.Y. Ho early
in 1974, had estimated the income elasticities for total
government expenditure as well as for the disaggregated
functional categories. Tt was later re-estimated by S.
Chow in (1977) for the same period using official GDP
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data from 1961 onwards, and his results are similar to
that of H.C.Y. Ho's.
In this study, the various types of expenditure
elasticities with respect to GDP have again been
estimated so as to take into consideration data from
recent years, (1971/72 to 1984/85) not included in the
above studies. Results of estimation are shown in Table
4.1. Ho's estimation is also included for a comparison.
Results indicated that for the period 1949/50-
1984/85, the elasticity for total expenditure is 1.13.
Hence, a 1% increase in GDP would then imply a 1.13% rise
in total government expenditure. This result seems to be
in accordance with Wagner's Law which implied an
elasticity in excess of unity. But it is smaller than
the elasticity value found by Ho's study for the period
1949/50-1970/71. This would indicate that the rise in
total expenditure over GDP has slowed down after the
1970s. This is not surprising as has been suggested by
Borcherding (1985), when the. economy progresses,
government expenditure growth cannot exceed GDP growth
forever. This has also been intelligently predicted by
Wagner a hundred years ago. He foresaw the natural
hindrance in the growth of public sector because of the
lack of revenue. Even government borrowing would not be
able to support an ever-growing public sector when the
cost of borrowing, i.e. the interest payment is to be
taken into consideration. Expenditure growth will slow
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Table 4.1 ESTIMATION OF EXPENDITURE ELASTICITIES WITH
RESPECT TO GDP
















1. The elasticities are estimated from regression
equations in the form in E= a+ b In Y where E
represents the various expenditure and Y represents
GDP, both in per-capita real terms.
Data used are for the period 1949/50-1984/85. The
regression coefficients are all significant at the 99%
level.
2. Extrated from H.C.Y Ho, "Growth of Government
Expenditure in Hong Kong", op.cit. P.25. Calculation
had been made using the double-log equation as
expressed in 1, and results are all significant at 99%
level.
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down to equilibrium of around unit elasticity at some
later stage.
Elasticities of general service and economic
service for the two periods are similar in that they are
both less than elasticity of total expenditure. The
elasticity of economic service is smaller as expected,
indicating the limited direct involvement of government
in private economic activities. General service
expressed the slowest growth as indicated by Ho's
estimation. However, the elasticity increased by one-
third when the period is extended to 1984/85. This may
indicate the increase in administrative expenditure and a
reflection of a rise in officialdom of government
bureaucracy. Fortunately, it has not outgrown the
expansion of the private sector.
The high elasticity value for social services
and community services would reflect that Hong Kong
Government has, through the years, been vastly involved
in maintaining social stability in Hong Kong, for social
services concerns mainly with the provision of subsidized
education and medical services as well as providing low-
cost housing to the lower income group and community
services concerns the development of infrastructure for
better business environment.
In Ho's study, social services had the highest
elasticity value of 1.96; while community services came
next, at 1.66. Both these two services have higher
elasticity values than total expenditure, which implies
their faster growth as compared with total expenditure.
With the extension of the period of study to 198485,
social service and community service have similar
elasticity values with the latter being a little higher.
Hence, it indicates that the significance of community
service seems to have caught up with that of social
service in recent, years. This may be due to the sharp
growth in community service in the late 1970s and early
1980s.
A recent study by Y.P. Ho (1987) established a
more rigorous income elasticity estimation. In his
analysis, per capita real government expenditure was
postulated to be a function of per capita real income and
share of tax in total income. Partial-adjustment
analysis was applied.
An instrumental variable by summing exports and gross
domestic capital formation was used to replace the per
capita real income variable for the purpose of
purifying' the influence of GDPN on u.
Results indicated that the long run income
elasticities for all expenditure categories generally
follow expectations, and the instrumental variable
resulted in a smaller, yet similar pattern of income
50
elasticity than COLS estimate.
4.2 The Model of This study
I began the analysis by considering the model
developed by Borcherding (1985). It is assumed that each
citizen in the economy have a homogenous demand function
F for public provision of goods and services. The amount
of public goods demanded gi depends on the income. vi and
the price of public goods pi faced by the citizen i, i.e.
(4.1)
Thus, we have a vast spectrum of individuals ranging
along the preference axis. In every political system, we
can find a decisive individual whose preference will
decide the amount of consumption for all other citizens.
Denoting the decisive preference holder by m, his demand
function for public goods may be expressed as:
(4.2)
where g1: Amount of government goods demanded by the
decisive preference holder m
ym: Income of the decisive preference holder
Marginal price of gm perceived by the
Pm
decisive preference holder
ev: Income elasticity of demand for government
supply of goods and services
e Price elasticity of demand for government
p
supply of goods and services.
The total quantity of government goods for the
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economy as a whole depends on the publicness of the goods
provided by the government. With a population of N
citizens, each consuming equal quantities of gm, total
government goods supplied g will be (gm* N), if it is a
purely private good, but equals gm if it is purely
public, i .e.
(4.3)
Total government goods suppliedwhere
Population
The crowding parameter
for purely public goods
for purely private goods. Hence,
(4.4)
As discussed by Borcherding (1985) the
perceived marginal price of public goods depends on the
share of total government spending borne by the median
voter:
(4.5)
where G: Total nominal government spending,
Perceived tax share of the decisive
preference holder
Relative price of government goods.
As individuals will have ideas about changes in the taxes
and changes in expenditure, the perceived tax share
paid
is used by the individuals to determine his demand for
public goods. Then, the level- of total nominal
government spending will be:
In studying public sector on a time-seri
. _ basis f_ .we are .more interested in _t.he rela_tive_size of t.
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public sector as a proportion of national income. Henc
we have :
where S : Share of government, expenditure in nationa
1 nPATYlD (CI V
an
: National income;
: Per capita income, (Y N);
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Recent studies by Meltzer and Richard, Peltzman and
several other scholars studying government redistributive
expenditure have considered variations in the
distribution of income between citizens as a possible
source of government expansion.
For the theories on interest groups, Mueller
and Murrell (1986) have suggested a positive link between
interest group influence and relative public size.
Hence, we should consider this factor as a possible
explanation for a rising share of government.
Although there is no formal framework testing
the active influence of government bureaucracy and
politicians on public expenditure growth, due to the
risinq significance in these areas of study, it would
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also be better to introduce variables of bureaucratic
strength and tax visibility into the model as possible
factors for rising relative public expenditure as well.
As mentioned- previously, a fuller development
of models explaining public sector growth would be to
incorporate different economic and political
considerations. It would be justified to include the
influence of other variables on the assumption that these
other factors may be additive to the income, price and
population variables.
.3 The Measurement of Relative Size of the Public
Sector
Problems occurred as regards the measurement of
relative size of the public sector. Concerning the size
of government sector, as Mueller and Murrell (1986)
noted, No one measure may fully capture the concept of
governmental size. Previous studies on measurement of
public sector have used various proxies for government
size. Among the common ones are total government
expenditure, government purchases and total tax revenue.
Total government expenditure, which consists of
government purchases and government transfer payments,
may overstate government's use of resources as it
includes transfers. However, government transfers is
becoming a more and more important component of the
government sector, and like government purchases, it is
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also determined by political decisions about allocative
and distributive objectives. Besides, finance of
transfer programmes also requires diversion of taxpayers'
income towards government. Accordingly, using only
government purchases expenditures on goods and services
to proxy government size is equally inadequate.
Government tax revenue behaviour is very susceptible to
economic performance and income changes, hence, it may
lead to biased results.
In view of this, alternative measures using (i)
ratio of total government consolidated expenditure over
total income (ii) ratio of government consumption and
investment expenditure over total income (iii) ratio of
total government consolidated revenue over total income
and (iv) ratio of total government tax revenue over total
income will be employed as relative public sector measure
for Hong Kong.
The variables above all measure aggregate
government size. Yet, some factors may have greater
effect on certain disaggregated components of government
than on others. Government expenditure may be
disaggregated according to either functional
classification or economic classification. However, due
to the availability of data, we can only perform
estimation on the functional categories of government
expenditure, which are the general service, economic
service, community service and social service.
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For total income, the value of GDP at market
prices is used. As government expenditure and revenue
are estimated on a fiscal year basis, while GDP is
estimated on a calendar year basis, in order to be on the
same. comparable basis, GDP data has been converted-to
fiscal year basis as well by assuming that GDP is
produced evenly throughout the year.
4.4 Factors Affecting the Growth of Relative Public
Sector
4.4.1 Income Effect
According to Wagner's Law, a faster growth of
the government sector relative to private sector during
income rises would imply an income elasticity ev to be
greater than unity.
A number of problems would be involved as to
the determination of income. Most models used the median
voter theorem and assumed that the median voter is the
decision maker19 However, his income cannot be easily
determined. Bergstrom and Goodman postulated that the
median preference holder is also the median income
earner, with strong assumptions. 20 However, there is no
general consensus that median income is a better proxy
for income of the decisive preference holder. Mean or
other quantiles of income may also be possible.
The median voter model will also become
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problematic under the assumptions of a different
political system where the decision maker may not
21
necessarily be the median voter. Several empirical
studies have used mean income as the income of the
decisive preference holder.
Borcherding and Deacon estimated that the
income elasticity varied from 0.1 to 2.7 for the
different types of government expenditure across 44
states. They used average income as a proxy for the
income of the median preference holder by assuming that
the two income measures are highly correlated. Bergstrom
and Goodman found the coefficient to vary from 0.7 to 2.8
using government expenditure on different categories for
826 municipalities. They indicated similar results.
According to Borcherding, a lot of studies found income
elasticity being around 0.75. he proposed that the
reason for the low elasticity value was because studies
are mostly conducted on local instead of national data,
and the income specification may not be appropriate.
In Hong Kong, it seems more reasonable to use
mean income as the income of the decisive preference
holder rather than median income which has been assumed
in many other studies. This is because, firstly, data
for median income is not easily available. Besides, the
decision makers in Hong Kong are the Governor and senior
government officials. They are responsible to Britain by
and a direct voting system does not exist. Hence,
law,
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the political system cannot be asserted as a direct
democracy. Nevertheless, Hong Kong Government do gather
and consider public opinions before many policy
implementations, e.g. by consultations and surveys. But
as Miners has noted that in Hong Kong, Officials are
-highly __selecti.ve -in--choosing-the-groups _.wi.th__ .which they
are willing to hold consultations. This system favors
the richer business and employer groups, who are largely
represented on the advisory committees. Therefore, the
decisive preference holder is likely to be at a higher
level of income than the median income for Hong Kong.
This justified the use of per capita GDP for y in this
study.
4.4.2 Price Effect
In many models that treat government spending
as an outcome of demand and supply conditions in a market
for government goods, price is treated as a factor for
government expansion. The rise in the marginal price
perceived by the decisive preference holder, with
inelastic price demand for public goods, i.e. -1epo,
would lead to a rise in government spending.
Similarly, a fall in relative price accompanied by
elastic price demand for public goods, i.e. ep-1, would
bear the same effect.
However, the price perceived by the decisive
voter can be affected by the following four factors:( i
Relative price of public to private goods (ii) Perceived
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tax share of the decisive voter; (iii) productivity
advancement; and (iv) population.
(i) Relative price of public to private goods:
From eq.(4.5), it can be seen that relative
price of public to private goods p, determines the
marginal price perceived by the decisive preference
holder Pm. Assuming that ep is inelastic, the effect of
a rise in p will be positively related to the increase in
relative public sector s.
However, data for the price of government goods
is one variable which is not easily available. Most
empirical studies on cross-sectional analysis assume
insignificant variation in the relative prices across
places under study, while time-series analysis assume
insignificant changes in relative price over time.
In a study on changes in the rate of
productivity of local government, Spann has used an index
proxying the relative price of public output:
Government price deflator
Index of relative price
Consumer price index
This would serve as a simple way to measure the changes
in relative price of government supplied goods to
privately supplied goods. In Hong Kong, the only price
index series for government expenditure which can be
available for the long period in this study would be the
deflator series for government consumption and investment
expenditure.
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tit} Perceived tax share
In addition, the tax share of median voter will
also directly affect the price facing the decisive voter.
For simplicity, Borcherding and
Deacon assumed that taxes are shared evenly between
citizens of a community. This is because as the
population of the economy grows, there will be more
people in the community to pay taxes. Hence, there would
be an inverse relationship between population and tax
share. Hence, for simplicity purpose, we can use the
assumption that tm= 1/N in this study. Then eq.(4.7)
becomes:
(4.7')
However, the assumption of non-discriminatory
tax would not be very realistic. Bergstrom and Goodman
estimated the tax share of the median voter as the share
of tax on real property paid by the citizen with median
income. This is because property tax constituted more
than half of local revenue of the municipalities. They
assume the citizen with median income is the decisive
voter and he owns houses of median value. and this is
the only holding of real property he has. It is further
assumed, for convenience, that the decisive voter pays
the same share for other taxes. Results show that the
tax share parameters are negative, ranging from -0.7 to-
0.1 and were significant.
We now turn to the case of Hong Kong. A
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comprehensive study by Ho (1977) on the tax system of
Hong Kong reviews that the direct taxes taken as a whole
are progressive, (as opposed to the view of the general
public) while the indirect taxes taken as a whole are
slightly regressive for the lowest two income groups and
nearly proportional. for the rest of the income groups.
Hence, citizens in the lower income groups pay a much
smaller share of direct taxes and larger share of
indirect taxes. 22 The income of the decisive preference
holder has been proxied by per capita GDP. This income
is among the lowest income bracket susceptible to direct
taxes. We may assume that, in general, most of the
burden of direct taxes falls on the higher income groups,
especially when nearly all of estate duty falls on the
highest income group. Hence, we may approximate that the
decisive preference holder pays negligible share of
direct taxes. As the value of per capita GDP is in the
third income bracket which would be subject to
proportional indirect tax burden, we may assume that the
decisive preference holder shared in the payment of
indirect taxes in proportion to his income. Under these
considerations, the tax share of the decisive preference
23
holder will be:
Yet, perceptions may be quite imprecise and may
not be equivalent to the actual tax share. Bergstrom and
assumed that perceived tax share of individuals
Goodman
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is an independently distributed random variable with
expected value equal to the actual tax share. Thev
proved that in large populations, effects of independent
errors of perception tend to cancel each other and
statistical distortions in estimation due to the presence
of wrong perceptions are likely to be negligible.
(iii) Productivity advancement:
Nothing has yet been mentioned about the effect
of productivity advancement. The Baumol effect suggested
that difference in productivity growth between private
and public sector would lead to changes in their relative
24
prices.
Government sector is mainly involved in the
production of services. Service industries are in
general, more labour-intensive and incur less
technological changes like increases in capital
equipments. As the potential for productivity
advancement would be enhanced mostly from technological
changes, hence, productivity advances in services
industry would be smaller. As a result, the rate of
productivity advancement in government sector would lag
behind the private sector. Assuming similar pay rate for
the private and public sectors, a smaller productivity
advancement would result in a higher cost for the public
relative to the private sector.
Another reason for low productivity growth in
62
the public sector may be due to bureaucratic behaviour.
Tndeed, Spann (1977) 's study has shown that this has been
a better explanation for low productivity gain than
labour-intensive nature of government services.
The study of productivity of public sector is a
relatively new topic. Spann has tried to estimate the
change in productivity for various government services
like education, health and hospitals, etc. on U.S.
Measurement of productivity is made using input-output
ratio by proxying input by the number of full-time
equivalent employees and output by population and total
budget size. However, the output proxies may be too
generalized. Also it would be better to use total factor
input rather than just labour input measure.
Nevertheless, the productivity ratio thus measured did
indicate the trend of productivity change, but not the
actual level of productivity. The result showed that
productivity gain in local government for different
services tend to be equal. to or less than zero on
average.
No matter which reason causes the low
productivity gain in public output, this would be
reflected in the relative price level between the public
and private sectors. As indicated by Spann, the price of
government output rose by 1.5% per annum. Peltzman
(1980) found the growth of relative prices to be
approximately 1.4% and Borcherding (1977)'s deduction was
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1-25%. The figures similarly indicated a rising relative
price for government output. The effect of low
productivity advancement would hence be incorporated into
the relative price eeffect on government expenditure.
(iv) Population:
The effect of population on the perceived
marginal price of decisive preference holder will be
discussed in the following section.
4.4.3 Population Effect
Population has been an obvious factor for
government expenditure growth. Yet,, its effect on
government expenditure is quite complicated. Discussions
of the 'publicness' of government services usually
includes a population variable in the interpretation of
government expenditure. By definition, public goods
would have significant scale economies in consumption.
Hence, we would expect the crowding-out parameter en
which indicates the degree of publicness of government
supply to be close to 0. On the other hand, the effect
of population on the growth of relative public sector
also depends on the price elasticity of demand as
eq.(4.6) indicates. If we predict -1ep0 and 0en1,
the coefficient of population en (ep+1) -1 or (en-1) (ep+1)
will be negative, indicating that an increase in
population, under the assumption that government goods
exhibit scale economies in consumption, would be
accompanied by the lowering of relative public sector.
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4.4.4 Skewness of Income Distribution
Previously, we have predicted that the income
elasticity of demand for government goods, ey is greater
than unity. Hence, we would expect that rising median
relative to mean income be accompanied by a rising share
of government expenditure.
However, the skewness of income distribution
variable does not prove to be a satisfactory factor for
government expansion in several studies such as Meltzer
and Richard (1985). Mueller and Murrell (1987).
Besides, as data for median income of Hong Kong
citizens is not easily available, and studies on income
distribution are rare, sufficient observations for
skewness of income distribution cannot be obtained.
Data on income distribution are only available
for the various census years. Estimation for income
distribution before 1957 are poor. From Table 4.2, it
can be seen that, over the period 1957 to 1966, the Gini
coefficient rose from 0.48 to 0.50, indicating that
income distribution may have worsened slightly. In
1965/66, there were bank runs and civil riots. The
massive influx of refugees between the period 1957 and
1966 may have led to the worsening of income distribution
as they caused increased unemployment and under-
employment. Since 1966, income distribution may have
slightly improved as shown by the lowering of Gini
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Standard deviation: 0.025Mean value: 0.466
Sources: For estimated Gina'. Coefficients on or before 1966: from
S.C.M. Chow, Economic Growth and Income Distribution in
Hong Kong, Michigan: University Microfilms International
1981, p.239, Table 3.13
For estimated Gini Coefficient in 1971, 1976 and 1981:
from Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong 1981,
Census Main Report, Vol.2, H.K. Government Printer.
66
coefficient. This may be due to industrialization and
increased exports which led to increase in demand for
labour. Hence, refugees and excess labour no longer
became the major problem. Besides, the start of public
assistance schemes in 1971 may also have led to
improvement in income distribution. However, the changes
in Gini coefficient were very small (the standard
deviation is only 0.025) and it might easily be affected
by data error. In view of this, it seems reasonable to
assume that income distribution in Hong Kong does not
change systematically with government expansion
throughout the period under study, and we can ignore the
variable w.
Hence, eq.(4.7) and (4.7') becomes:
(4.8)
= [Indirect tax revenue* (1/N)]/Total tax revenue
(4.8')
4.4.5 Interest group influence:
The concept of an 'interest group' is
extremely nebulous, as noted by Murrell. Data
concerning interest groups are, in general, very rare. A
common distinction of interest groups of various types is
to classify in terms of 'sectional' and 'promotional'
groups. Sectional' groups. are groups organized to
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undertake or protect a special occupational or sectional
interest or certain economic activity, e.g. industry and
trade associations, labour unions, chambers of commerce,
etc. 'Promotional' groups are those groups organized to
express a particular policy preference. Their goals are
less closely related to the primary economic activities
of its members than those of sectional groups.
In an empirical study by Mueller and Murrell
(1987), the proxy used for interest group influence is
the total number of groups listed in the "World Guide to
Trade Associations" for each country. These groups are
all sectional. groups according to the above distinctions.
Estimation was done on a linear equation which
includes, as independent variables, the number of
interest groups and several additional variables that
alternative studies of government have found to be
important determinants of government size. These
includes population, mean income, median income, voter
participation, etc.
The study done by Mueller and Murrell (1987)
showed that in a cross-sectional analysis on OECD
countries, the number of organized interest groups is
positively and significantly related to the relative size
of government spending. It was assumed that these
factors are additive to the explanation. The coefficient
for interest group was found to be 0.005 on average and
is mostly significant at 99% level.
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In Hong Kong, non-government organizations can
be broadly classified into seven main categories. They
are the business groups (e.g. the Chinese Manufacturer's
Association), the professional groups (e.g. the society
of Accountants), trade unions (like the Motor Transport
Worker's Union), religious and charitable groups (e.g.
the Po Leung Kuk), recreational groups, local groups,
25
etc.
It is required by law that these organizations
be registered with either the Registrar of Trade Unions,
the Hong Kong Registrar General's Department, or the
Registrar of Societies under the Commissioner of Royal
Hong Kong Police Force. The Registrar of Trade Unions
(and before 1955, the Hong Kong Labour Department), deals
with the registration of trade unions including workers'
unions, employers' associations and other mixed unions.
The Hong Kong Registrar General's Department deals with
registration of companies including companies with or
without share capital. The Registrar of Societies deals
with registration of societies and exemption for groups
of religious, charitable, social or recreational
purposes.
Due to the non-availability of alternatives,
the total number of interest groups is used in this study
to proxy interest group influence as done by Mueller and
Murrell. Accordingly, the total no. of organizations
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listed in the Registrar of Trade Unions and the Registrar
of Societies in a certain year are summed up as the total
no. of interest groups for that year.
It would be necessary to give some-indication
as to the characteristics of organizations included in
the data. The organizations included are all formal non-
government organizations. These groups participate in
activities that differ from those of other economic
agents in that their activities are in pursuit of
relatively nonrival and non-excludable goods, nonrival as
it would increase the welfare of interest group members
by acting together, and non-excludable implies that these
groups would be different from 'clubs'. This explains
why the number of companies registered with Hong Kong
Registrar General's Department has not been included into
the data for total number of interest groups.
As Mueller and Murrell has indicated, some sort
of weighting of interest groups by their potential
influences should better be made. Yet, obvious choices
of weights such as the amount of group members may not be
appropriate enough, and data for other weights may not be
easily available. The assumption, hence, justifying the
use of number of interest group exerts the same influence
on stimulating or hindering relative government growth.
4.4.6 Visibility of tax system:
As is discussed in 3.3.5, tax visibility would
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affect the government expansion in that when the tax
system becomes less visible, the easier will the
legislature be able to deceive the citizens on the true
size of government. Hence, the legislature can raise
taxes more easily to finance for increased government
size.
The proxy for tax complexity used by Pommerehne
and Schneider (1985)'s study is a Herfindahi
concentration index of tax revenues from different
categories. The index being:
where Ri: is the tax revenue for the ith revenue item,
TR: is total tax revenue of government.
The index is unity when there is only one source of
revenue, and gets smaller when the sources of revenue
increase. However, the drawbacks of this index are that
the distinction between categories are quite arbitrary,
and that the index cannot capture all aspects of
complexity.
Pommerehne and Schneider have suggested the use
of another index: the share of highly 'visible' taxes,
i.e. the share of personal income and wealth taxes in
total government revenue. It is assumed that the lower
the share of 'visible' taxes in total revenue, the higher
will the citizens under-estimate their tax-cost, hence,
the higher will the desired level of government
expenditure be. This would seem to be a better index for
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this study. We use:




According to Niskanen and other scholars, the
strength of the bureaucracy is very important in
determining the relative size of government. However,
few studies have done on measuring the bureaucratic
strength of government. As a crude measure of the
bureaucracy, we may consider the proportion of total
factor cost in the community that is incurred by
government employees. Hence, the ratio for bureaucratic
strength will be:
Total emoluments of govt. employees
(excluding pensions)
Bureaucratic=
GDP at factor costStrength
This crude measurement, as limited by data
availability, may have underestimated the bureaucratic
strength as government emoluments data does not include
pensions. Besides, the GDP at factor cost is a gross
measurement which includes depreciation, hence, further
lowers the ratio.
4.4.8 Other factors:
There are other commonly used variables in
empirical studies of government expenditure. These
include population density,urbanization,industrialization
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and age groups differentiation, etc. 26 However, they do
not prove to have significant empirical support and the
signs and magnitudes of parameters vary greatly between
studies. It may be because these variables are more
difficult to quantify and using proxies for them may not
be good enough as a provider of econometric evidence.
4.4.9 Other important considerations
It has been obvious from discussions in Ch. 2
that there were two significant political events which
struck Hong Kong during the period under study, one is
the Riot in 1966 and another is the general loss of
confidence in 1982 due to the 1997 Problem of Hong Kong,
these two events might affect the relative size of
government by displacing government expenditure or GDP
values during the disturbance years. Hence, two dummy
variables D1 and D2 are incorporated into the equation to
be estimated in order to account for these political
effects. The value of D1 will be 1 for the years 1966/67
- 1968/69 and 0 for other years while D2 will be 1 for
1983/84 and 1984/85 and remain 0 for other years.
Estimations has been performed using ordinary
least square method and indirect least square method for
the time period starting 1949/50 to 1984/85 which is the
27
longest period in which data are available. The results
of estimations and their implications are discussed in
the next chapter. A surnnaI7 of variables used are listed in Table
4.3=
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Table 4.3 SUMMARY OF VARIABLES USED IN THE ESTIMATION
Variable DefinitionConcept MeasuredVariable
*Total consolidated government expendi ture/Relative government sizeI. EXP
Total GDP
*Government consumption and investmentRelative government size2. CON
expenditure/ Total GDP
*Total consolidated government revenue/ TotalRelative government size3. REV
GDP
*Total government tax revenue/ Tota_1 GDPRelative government size4. TAX
*General service expenditure/ Total GDPDisaggragated relative5. GS
government size
*Economic service expenditure/ Total GDPDisaggragated,relative6. ES
government size
*Community service expenditure/ Total GDPDisaggragated relative7. CS
government size
*Social service expenditure/ Total GDPDi.saggragated relative8. SS
government size
Per capita real GDPMean income9. MTNC
Government price deflator/ Consumer price10. PRTCE Relative price of public
indexto private goods
11. TAXSH Tax share
Indirect tax revenue multiplied by income
share in total economy, divided by total.
tax revenue
Variable 10 multiplied by Variable ii12. TAXPCII Tax price
1 3. POPU Population Total mid-year population
Total no. of societies, workers' unions14. NTNG Tnterest group influence
employers' associations and mixed unions
15. VTSTB Tax visibility *Earnings and Profits tax/ Total government
revenue
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Table 4.3 SUMMARY OF VARIABLES USED IN THE ESTIMATION
Variable DefinitionConcept MeasuredVariable
Total emoluments of government employees/Bureaucratic strength16. BUCRA
GDP at factor cost
Value is 1 for 1966/67-1968/69 and 0 for otherDummy variable for17. D1
political disturbance years
Value is 1 for 1983/84-1984/85 and 0 for otherDummy variable for18. D2
political disturbance years
Notes:* -indicates both nominator and denominator are at current prices.
# Following the use of the tax price variable, the dependent variables have
to be changed to the followings:
The relative government size variables (now in real terms):
REXP= EXP/PRICE RCON= CON/PRICE
RREV= REV/PRICE RTAX= TAX/PRICE
The disaggragated government size variables (now in real terms):
RCS= GS/PRICE RES= ES/PRICE
RCS= CS/PRICE RSS= SS/PRICE.
5 EMPIRICAL estimations and results
For a preliminarv estimation, the relative
government size variables are first regressed with per
capita real GDP alone, in order to form a basis of
comparison for the other results.
i.e. In(GOV
where GOV denotes EXP, CON, REV and TAX,
and
The first four equations in Table 5.1 provide
the result for estimating income elasticity alone. The
coefficients for MINC. were found to be positive for all
the dependent, variables estimated and were more
significant, for CON and REV equations. The income
elasticities range from 1.02 to 1.13. It reflected that,
government is growing slightly faster than the private
sector as income rises.
5.1 Estimation on Aggregated Government. Sector




Table 5.1: The results obtained by adding the relative
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price and population variables into the equation did
lower the magnitude of income elasticity, but raised its
significance. From the R2 and Durbin-Watson statistics,
it can be seen that R2 was raised from 0.2 to 0.8 and D-W
value was raised from 0.3 to 1.3 by the addition of PRICE
and POPU variables, while the F-ratio was also improved.
This might imply that the income elasticity obtained- by
regressing relative government share with per capita GDP
alone may be upward biased due to the omission of other
variables. 28 This is because the addition of price and
population variables significantly improved the various
test statistics but lowered the income elasticity value.
Hence, the addition of price and population variables did
improve the explanatory power of the model.
For the coefficient of price, it was found to
be significant at 95% and having values greater than 1.
This would be quite unexpected as it gives a positive
price elasticity for the demand of government goods and
services. The reason for this unexpected result may be
that government expenditure includes a large portion of
grants and subventions, bearing little direct
relationship to government price deflator which is
formulated mainly by the wage index of government
employees.
The population coefficient found was
significant at 90% and positive. After allowing for the
price elasticity effect, the crowding parameter en have
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values greater than unity.29 This might indicate that
goods and services provided by the government exhibit
little economy of scale in being consumed together, viz.
they have private good nature. This would be reasonable
as social service is taking a more and more important
role in government activities in recent years as is
observable from the fact that nearly half of total
government expenditure are social services expenditure
since 1980, and social service is relatively more private
than other services.
However, this might also be due to the reason
that unit cost of providing goods and services to people
rises as population increases. Assuming no economy of
scale in production for large population, and the rise in
per unit cost when population grows cannot be
countervailed by more people sharing in payment of taxes
to finance the cost, then government expenditure would
rise relative to GDP. 30
Moreover, as Borcherding and Deacon(1972) had
noted, rent-seeking groups may form around the decisive
preference holder in order to secure the provision of
goods and services which benefit mostly to themselves or
to differentially tax-others at higher rates. In Hong
Kong, there has been no restrictions imposed to prevent
the formation of such coalitions. Hence, the observed
effect of population on the relative government size,
i.e. en will be a combination of the above effects. Due
t.o the lack of empirical knowledge, it will be very
difficult to respecifv our model to discriminate between
these effects.




The results are presented in Table 5.2. It can
be seen that the R and Durbin-Watson statistics are
improved. Yet, the income elasticity is lowered.
Theoretically, the coefficient of ln(TAXSH) will be one
minus the coefficient of ln(PRICE). However, result did
not. indicate this relationship. The coefficients of
In (PRICE) are significant, at 99% and greater than 1,
implying that ep is positive, while the coefficient of
In(TAXSH), which should be the value for ep , are all
negative and significant at 95% level. The negative
coefficient of In(TAXSH) indicates that as tax share of
the decisive preference holder falls, the marginal price
facing the decisive preference would also decrease.
Hence, government goods and services appeared cheaper and
its demand would increase relative to private goods.
That is, the relative size of government, sector expands.
A glance through the data review that TAXSH has
Table 5 • 2 ESTIMATION OF RELATIVE PUBLIC SECTOR FUNCTIONS USING ORDINARY LEAST SQUARESMETHOD,
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1. Tncome elasticity (ev) = 1 - coetticient ot In(MTNC).
A. Tax price elasticity ' ) = coefficient of In(TAXPC)
is the price elasticity resulted from assumptior
that the tax share = indirect tax revenue multiplier
hv income share in total economy, divided by total
tax revenue.
3. Relative price elasticity (e ) = 1 + coefficient of
In(PRTCK)
is the price elasticity resulted from assumption
that tax share = 1 nonulation.
L. Tax share parameter = coefficient of ln(TAXSH).
5. Crowding parameter : (Refer Reference Note.
is the indicator for economies of scale in
consumption ot government goods and services
under the assumption that tax share = indirect
tax revenue multiplied by income share in total
pmnnniv. divided bv total tax rtavgnug.
is the coefficient of ln(TAXPC
is the coefficient of ln(POPU
is the standard error of
is the indicator tor economies of scale in
consumption ot government goods and services
under the assumption that tax share = 1
nopuI ation.
w here is the coefficient of In(PRTCF)
is the coefficient ot ln(P0PIJ
is the standard error of
generally been decreasing throughout, the period under
study, while PRICE variable fluctuates but vaguely shows
an upward trend. This might account for the difference
3n their direction of effects on relative government
size. Hence, it may be better to respecifv the model by
considering the two effects together so as to obtain a
more consistent estimate of the price elasticity.
This is done by merging the two variables
TAXSH and PRICE, together as follows :
In(RGOV
where In(TAXPC) = In(PRICE) + In(TAXSH)
and RGOV =GOV PRICE is the relative government size (in
real terms), i.e. RGOV denotes REXP, RC.ON, RREV and RTAX,
anc:
This resulted in a larger value for income
elasticity. The price elasticities are all negative, but
less significant. Moreover, all price elasticity values
are within -1 and 0, indicating inelastic price demand
for government, expenditure. Eq(5.4) might serve to be a
better specification than eq(5.3). (Table 5.2)
We then tried the effect of .interest, groups
influence on relative government size by including the





f 5 . 5 M
Bv including the NING variable, the performance
of the equations generally remains good, as can be seer
from the and D-W statistics as shown in Table 5.3.
The coefficient for income was slightly lowered but still
significant at 99%level and the performance of
coefficients for the other variables did not change
signif j cant.lv.
Results indicated that the coefficient of NING,
which is also the elasticity of percentage rise in
relative government size against percentage increase in
number of interest groups, is positive and more
significant for the RCON and CON equations. The
coefficients have values of around 0.5 indicating that
increase in the number of interest groups would lead to
rising government relative to private sector. This also
conform with the predictions of interest group theories.
However, the importance of interest, group influence
cannot be ascertained due to the rather weak significance
for its coefficients in the REXP and EXP equations. On
the other hand, the coefficients of NING are significant
for the RTAX and TAX equations. This would indicate that
the effect of interest groups on relative government size
is .independent of whether the interest groups influence
the direction of government expenditure or the direction
Table 5 . ; ESTIMATION OF RELATIVE PUBLIC SECTOR FUNCTIONS USING ORDINARY LEAST SQUARESMETHOD,
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Notes : Values of t-statistics are In parentheses.
Values exceeding 2.7 Indicates that a coefficient is significant at 99% level;
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Table 5. 3 (Cont)
Dependent Income Rel. PriceTax Price Crowding
Variable Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Parameter
R EXP 0.423 2.234-0. 236
-0.125R CON 1.5430.502
-0.533R REV 2.0980.842





Note: The elasticities and crowding parameter are calculated
as done in Table 5.2, p.81.
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of tax revenue.
The tax visibility variable, VISIB, as proxied
by the ratio of total earnings and profits tax in total





Results for the estimations are presented in
Table 5.4. With TAXPC variable, the coefficients of
VISIB have negative sign in REXP, RCON and RREV
equations. This implies that decreasing value of VISIB,
i.e. the lowering of tax visibility (as the ratio of
earnings and profits tax in total revenue becomes
smaller), would be accompanied by increased share of the
public sector. The coefficients are large and
significant. The performance of the equations in general
are similar to that before adding VISIB, and the
performance of the other variables also remain the same
except that t-statistics are lowered. The R2 and D-W
statistics are lowered as well.
For the addition of VTSIB in eq. (5. 6'), the
coefficients of VISIB are negative
only in CON and REV equations. For the EXP equation,
total government expenditure consists-
Table 5.4 ESTIAMTION OF RELATIVE PUBLIC SECTOR FUNCTIONS USING ORDINARY LEAST SQUARESMETHOD,




cept InMINC InTAXPC InPRICE InPOPU InNING InVISIB D1 D2
REXP -10.724 -0.654 -0.479
(-2.418) (-4.447) (-1.844)
0.606 0.334 -0.236 -0.062 0.134
1.658) ( 0.836) (-1.483) (-0.861) ( 1.561)
RCON -11.006 -0.574 -0.368
(-2.886) (-4.545) (-1.649)
0.184 0.605 -0.236 0.063 0.596
0.584) ( 1.763) (-1.725) ( 1.024) ( 0.808:
RREV -21.106 -0.342 -1.117
6-4.8421 (-2.365) (-4.373)
-0.308 0.183 -0.566 -0.074 -0.167
(-0.857) ( 0.466) (-3.614) (-1.050) (-1.985:
rtax -9.345 -0.340 -0.432
(-2.942) (-3.234) (-2.319)
-0.247 0.218 0.054 -0.046 -0.078
;-0.943) ( 0.763) ( 0.476) (-0.897) (-1.270)
EXP -0.165 -0.630
;-0.057) (-4.080)
1.476 0.439 0.358 0.048 -0.047 0.306
(2.632) ( 0.954) ( 0.871) ( 0.316) (-0.671) ( 3.784)
CON -2.835 -0.591
(-1.110) (-4.329)
1.241 0.120 0.644 -0.032 0.085 0.198
(2.502) ( 0.294) ( 1.769) (-0.234) ( 1.353) ( 2.762)
REV -2.738 -0.273
(-0.804) (-1.499)
0.977 -0.167 0.467 -0.112 -0.100 0.088




0.534 0.041 0.403 0.172 -0.028 0.028
(1.346) ( 0.126) ( 1.382) ( 1.594) (-0.566) ( 0.484)
Notes : Values of t—statistics are in parentheses.












































































Note : The elasticities and crowding parameter are calculated
as done in Table 5«2, P.31.
not. only of government, purchase expenditure, but also
of transfers and subventions, hence, the variable VISIB is
not significant, and its coefficient is of the opposite
sign from that predicted. The other variables perform
similarly as in eq.(5.6). However, with
smaller values for R and D-W statistics as well as the t-ratic
of other variables after adding VISIB, it. might indicate that
tax visibility is not important in affecting the growth
of relative public sector.
Concerning the addition of the bureaucratic
strength variable, we have :
In(RGOV)
In(GOV)
and the results are presented in Table
In spite of the crudeness of the data, the
BUCRA variable, which is assumed to proxy bureaucratic
strength, generally have positive coefficients as
expected, indicating that larger proportion of
bureaucratic strength would be associated with larger
public relative to private sector. The coefficients are
small and not as significant for eq.(5.7'), but are large
and significant at over 95% for eq. (5.7) . The income
elasticities are rendered higher by the inclusion of
able 5 5 ESTIMATION OF RELATIVE PUBLIC SECTOR FUNCTIONS USING ORDINARY LEAST SQUARESMETHOD,

















-0.078 0.296 -0.384 0.784 -0.075 -0.015
f-n.lifil 10.7431 (-2.437) ( 3.054) (-0.105) (-0.149)
-13.130 -0.297 -0.545
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-0.253 0.619 -0.367 0.624 0.060 -0.053
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-23.459 -0.036 -1.316
(-5.355) (-0.159) (-4.679)
-0.807 0.183 -0.701 0.664 -0.080 -0.289
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-0.236 -0.448
(-0.082) (-1.907)
1.232 0.177 0.358 0.039 0.257 -0.072 0.259
a a«a r n on A O 7 O A OCC 1 HOC) A 6 4'7 O 7AA
-2.896 -0.437
(-1.133) (-2.100)
1.034 -0.102 0.644 -0.039 0.217 0.064 0.158
I Q1 7 ( A 11 O) ( 1 7£0 A O A 1 A A 7 A A AC.9 1 A1 A
-2.714 -0.333
(-0.785) (-1.183)
1.059 -0.080 0.467 -0.109 -0.086 -0.092 0.103
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-2.555 -0.318
(-1.242) (-1.183)
0.398 -0.105 0.403 0.167 0.143 -0.042 0.002






















Notes : Values of t-statistics are in parentheses.






Table 5.5 (Con' t)
Dependent Income Tax Price Rel. PricE Crowding
Variable Elasticity Elasticity Elasticit Parameter
-0.747REXP 0.739 1.557
-0.5450.703RCON 1.221
-1.316 -0.336RRE V 0.964
-{0.4940.794RTAX 1.066
EXP 0.552 0.232 1.115
CON 0.563 0.034 0. 922
REV 0.667 0.059 0.949
-0.602TAX 0.8790.682
Note: The elasticities and crowding parameter are calculated
as done in Table 5.2, P.31.
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BUCRA variable, though with lower t-ratios. The income
elasticities range from 0.55 to 0.96. This approximate
to 0.7 on average which is consistent with the income
elasticity discovered for other countries by many
empirical studies on Wagner's Law.
The coefficients of the PRICE variable are
smaller and less significant. The coefficients of the
TAXPC variable, on the other hand, are more significant,
being at 95% significance level for all 4 equations, and
the price elasticities thus calculated have larger
absolute values. The statistical performance of the
other variables are similar. The various test statistics
also indicated similar performance as those equations
without adding BUCRA.
In summary, the regression results for the
ordinary least squares estimation indicated that the
coefficients of all variables, except VISIB and NING,
have the expected signs and are mostly significant. This
evidence would imply that for the period under study, a
government expenditure function exists in Hong Kong.
5.2 Regression Analysis on Disaggregated Functional
Categories
Although we have established an endogenous
equation for aggregate public expenditure, it would be
reasonable to expect that some of the variables that
affect the aggregated expenditure would have more effec
on certain components of public expenditure than o:
others. Therefore, estimations have also been performer
on disaggregated functional categories of governmen
services so as to find out to what extend each variable
affects different services expenditure.
In view of this, the following equations had




where RFUNC denotes RGS, RES, RCS and RSS; and FUNC
denotes GS, ES, CS and SS.
For the variable MINC, results indicate that it
is not. significantly related to all functional
expenditure categories as do total expenditure, and do
not affect each category to the same extent. The
variable is most significant for social service and
general service, around 99% and 90% level respectively,
while least significant for community service. Yet,
community service has the highest income elasticity,
being 1-2, even higher than that for total expenditure
(which is only 0.7). General service has an income
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(-1.775) ( 0.399) (-1.800)
-18.700 -0.797 -0.774
(-3.994) (-3.326) (-2.575)
-1.432 0.333 -0.377 0.108 0.001 0.175
(-3.277) ( 1.018) (-2.909) ( 0.513) ( 0.017) ( 2.099)
0.89 26.22 1.73
-0.009 -0.005 -0.019 0.384 -0.030 -0.216
(-0.011) (-0.009) (-0.077) ( 0.950) (-0.270) (-1.347)
0.88 23.87 0.99
0.011 -0.442 -0.591 1.338 -0.221 -0.364
( 0.008) (-0.434) (-1.465) ( 2.036) (-1.205) (-1.397)
0.68 7.13 0.97
0.329 1.051 -0.287 0.823 -0.022 -0.116














1.257 -0.860 0.600 0.028 -0.283 0.021 ' 0.474
(2.127) (-1.687) ( 1.504) ( 0.188) (-1.166) ( 0.286) ( 5.255)
0.70 7.70 1.42
0.464 0.055 0.067 -0.041 0.532 -0.003 -0.199
(0.504) ( 0.070) ( 0.108) (-0.175) ( 1.404) (-0.028) (-1.419)
0.85 19.05 0.96
2.415 0.562 -0.232 0.095 0.602 -0.191 0.112
(1.582) ( 0.427) (-0.226) ( 0.247) ( 0.960) (-1.022) ( 0.483)
0.77 11.13 1.02
0.820 0.846 1.312 -0.017 0.598 -0.004 0.096
(1.253) ( 1.498) ( 2.971) (-0.102) ( 2.222) (-0.052) ( 0.962)
0.95 66.86 1.38
Notes : Values of t-statistics are In parentheses.






Table 5. 6 (Con' t)
Dependent Income Tax Price Rel. Price Crowding






GS 0.511 0.257 0.440
-0.536ES 0.489 1.024
CS 1.41.5 1. 16 60.897
-0.180 1.630SS 0.023
Note: The elasticities and crowding parameter are calculated
as done in Table 5.2, P.81.
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elasticity of 0.7, which is similar to that for total
expenditure. Economic service has an income elasticity
of about 0.5, and this has been expected due to the
minimum intervention policy of government in the private
sector. Unexpectedly, social service has the lowest
income elasticity of only 0.2, while its coefficient is
significantly different from 0 at 99% level.
According to Wagner's hypothesis on the law of
Increasing state activity, with the development of an
economy, as evidenced by increasing per capita real
income, it brings along increases in complexity and
friction between individuals. Hence, the need to
maintain order and a more efficient economy requires the
government to allocate more resources on legal, police
and administrative services. This has been evidenced by
the large and strongly significant income elasticity for
general service. Besides, the desire for better living
conditions and welfare services would also rise with
income.
As for the TAXPC variable, it is consistently
negative for all services and is significant at 90% level
except for economic service.
The coefficient of POPU is negative and
significant for general service. This is because general
service consists mainly of administrative{ police and
security services which are more likely to exhibit
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services of public nature. Social service are
comparativelv more private in nature as it contains those
expenditure on education, medical and housing, etc. in
which consumptions are rarelv non-rival. This has also
been reflected by the high value of 1. 6 for social
service.
The influence of interest groups is not
strongly significant for total expenditure. This mav be
explained by the results obtained in this part of the
study which indicated that the coefficient is
insignificant for general service, economic service and
community service. However, the coefficient of NING is
large and strongly significant at over 95% level for
social service. As the magnitude of the coefficient is
larger than 1, this would imply the relative share of
social service in GDP would rise faster than the increase
in total no. of interest groups. This result would not
be too surprising as social service is exactly the part
of expenditure that interest groups would be most eager
and is most likely to exert larger pressure to influence.
The large and significant coefficient of the
BUCRA variable for community service and social service
may be an indication of a growing bureaucracy in these
two service areas. This might be the consequence of
increased government involvements in community service
and social service. When government becomes more
involved in these services, the departments concerned
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would grow in size and become more complex and
specialized. For example, the Social Welfare office
began in 1947 only as a section in the Secretariat for
Chinese Affairs, with a staff of 2 officers. But it
became a department of its own in 1958, and is now
employing more than 2500 people in 1980. Following the
growth in size and complexity, the boundaries of
authority and responsibility would become more
complicated, and it would then be even easier for the
existing bureaucracy to multiphy and fragment.
Therefore, the importance of bureaucratic strength cannot
be ignored.
5.3 Simultaneous Equation Estimates
The equations presented above, as in most
empirical testing, may embody specification problems.
There may be simultaneity problems due to the common
macroeconomic postulations that total income is
endogenous in government expenditure. Hence, objections
to the foregoing results would arise from the possibility
of simultaneity and biased results.32 In view of this, it
would be better to seek exogenous variables which can be
used as instrumental variables for the endogenous income
variable. In Y.P. Ho(1987)'s study, the sum of exports
and gross domestic capital formation is used as exogenous
instrumental variable for GDP. This instrumental
variable may not be perfect as gross domestic capital
formation is not necessarily exogenous. However, due to
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the lack of better alternatives, this instrumental
variable is used at least to reduce, if not completely
eliminate, the simultaneity problem. In the absence of
better proxies, this instrumental variable has also been
employed in this study.
The regression results produced by the
instrumental variable procedures are set out in Tables
5•7,5.S.0n the whole, these estimates are consistent with
those of OLS estimates. There is some slight reduction
in the magnitude of the coefficients. This would
indicate that the OLS estimation is slightly upward
biased due to the presence of simultaneity effect of
government expenditure on total income. Nevertheless,
the instrumental variable method does not show
significantly different results from those of the OLS
estimates. Hence, the OLS estimation would also serve as
a simple and reliable method for analysis in this study.








REXF -13.989 -0.310 -0.781
(-3.197) (-1.172) -(-2.747)
-0.200 0.210 -0.300 0.509 -0.089 0.017
(-c 979) ( n 518) (-1989) ( 1.850) (-1.254) ( 0.170
RCOl -13.355 -0.343 -0.579
(-3.447) (-1.463) (-2.302
-0.379 0.531 -0.282 0.351 0.046 -0.022
f-C Qil r l ,75) f-0 ( 1 AA9) ( 0 7 9 9) (-() 949
RREV -23.461 0.066 -1.398
(-5.266) ( 0.245) (-4.831;
-1.073 -0.051 -0.609 0.519 -0.112 -0.282
(-1.997) (-0.124) (-3.953) (1.855) (-1.550) (-2.761)
RTAX -10.418 -0.155 -0.560
(-3.108) (-0.764) (-2.570)
-0.595 0.112 0.035 0.236 -0.063 -0.130
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EXP 0.444 -0.329
( 0.145) (-1.132)
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REV -0.454 0.062
(-0.120) ( 0.173;
0.985 -0.360 0.105 -0.053 0.232 -0.146 0.059





0.371 -0.209 0.269 0.188 0.261 -0.062 -0.015
(n 841 1 (-0 59M ( n 847) ( I 679) ( I 968) f-l 099) f-f) 91 6)
Notes : Values of t —statistics are In parentheses.
Values exceeding 2.7 indicates that a coefficient is significant at 99% level;





























Table 5. 7 (Con't)
Dependent Income Tax Price Rel. Price Crowding
Variable Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Parameter




EXP 0.671 0.209 1.061
CON 0.636 0.021 0.883
-0.015REV 1.062 0.770
-0.629TAX 0.829 0.767
Note: The elasticities and crowding parameter are calculated
as done in Table 5.2, P•81.




cept inMTNP. InTAXPC InPRICE InPOPU InNING InVISIB InBUCRA
ni D2
RGS -19.638 -0.105 -1.039
(-5.182) (-0.459) (-4.221)
-1.572 0,186 -0.369 0.236 -0.016 0.151
(-3.441) ( 0.529) ,(-2.819) (0.992) (-0.269) (1.739)
Res -2.665 -1.044 0.122
(-0.356) (-2.305) ( 0.251)
0.521 0.548 -0.046 -0.100 0.036 -0.124
( 0.577) ( 0.788) (-0.179) (-0.212) ( 0.294) (-0.722)
RCS -20.818 0.170 -1.327
(-1.781) ( 0.240) (-1.748)
0.076 -0.374 -0.595 1.278 -0.213 -0.352
( 0.054) (-0.344) (-1.471) ( 1.740) (-1.127) (-1.316!
R SS -19.0(1 -1.035 -0.698
(-3.994) (-3.585) (-2.250)
0.556 1.288 -0.299 0.617 0.006 -0.077
( 0.966) ( 2.905) (-1.810) ( 2.057) ( 0.082) (-0.703)
GS -1.407 -0.118
(-0.455) (-0.402)
1.188 -1.123 0.262 0.080 0.015 -0.030 0.432
(1.915) (-2.049) ( 0.586) ( 0.510) ( 0.051) (-0.374) ( 4.487)
ES -3.577 -1.076
(-0.743) (-2.351)
0.570 0.457 0.584 -0.121 0.077 0.074 -0.136
(0.591) ( 0.535) ( 0.840) (-0.493) ( 0.171) ( 0.597) (-0.910)
CS 5.126 0.153
( 0.670) ( 0.211)
2.367 0.381 -0.467 0.131 0.809 -0.226 0.084
(1.543) ( 0.281) (-0.423) ( 0.336) ( 1.129) (-1.151) ( 0.352)
SS -6.955 -1.053
(-2.124) (-3.380;
0.835 0.899 1.381 -0.027 0.538 0.006 0.104
(1.271) ( 1.550) ( 2.923) (-0.165) ( 1.753) ( 0.072) ( 1.024)
Notes :
Values of t-statistics are in parentheses.
Valuesexceeding 2.7 indicates that a coefficient is si8nificant at 99, ,evel;































Table 5. 8 (Con't)
Dependent Income Tax Price Rel. Price Crowding
Variable Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Parameter
-1.039R GS 0.895 0.360
-0.044RES 0.122 1.141
-1.327 -0.515RCS 1.170
-0.035 -0.698R SS 2.509




Note: The elasticities and crowding parameter are calculated
as done in Table 5.2, P.81.
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To sum up, several major points have to be
stressed. Firstly, the data defined are rough proxies of
the concepts studied. However, due to the lack of
alternative choices, they serve to be tentative trials
and their justifications may be subject to further
investigations.
Secondly, the two dummy variables used for
political disturbances do not serve to be particularly
sat.1 sf actorv i ndicati.ng that poi i ti c:al crisis would not
be significantly related to government expenditure growth
in Hong Kong, and these variables may be omitted in
future investigations.
Thirdly, for the purpose of drawing
C..ofCIuslolls, not all results are taken into
cons de ration. For equations using PRICE as one of the
independent, variables, the price elasticities thus
resulted do not have the correct signs as expected, and
the coefficients of other variables are in general less
sati sf actorv. This is because these equations are
derived under the assumption of non-discriminatory tax
share for the citizens, which is not realistic.
Moreover, with the addition of the. BUCRA
variable. most of the coefficients of In (PQPU) have
negative signs. The reversion of signs of the In (POPU)
coef f_ ici eats may be due to the high degree of
multicollinearity between the In(POPU) and In(BUCRA)
variables. These deficiencies of this study have led to
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contradictory resul. is which cannot he taken into
consideration when drawing conclusions. Fur. ther
investigations would be required for remedying these
deficiencies in order to arrive at a more appropriate
model for Hang Kong.
Given the level of aggregation, the rough
measurement of some of the concepts and the deficiencies
of the model, the results must be regarded as tentative.
However, these results do indicate promising. approachi to
further researches. In particular, with the coming of
1997 and the tendency for more direct voting
opportunities, the contribution of the public choice
variables to explaining government size and growth do




Hong Kong represents an interesting case
because it is among the most extreme examples of Adain
Smith liberalism. It is an economy with minimal
-government interventions and is assumed to be one of the
most laissez-faire economies. Resides, public
institutions are simple and we do not need to model
special collective decision processes like majority
voting, log rolling, etc.
The first part of this study deals with the
pattern and behaviour of government expenditure since the
post WWII period. It has been observed that social
service expenditure has increased significantly relative
to other expenditure categories. This has been a
worldwide phenomenon as well. Absolute government
expenditure follows an exponential rising trend, but
relative government expenditure over GDP ratio does not
continue to rise upwards through time as the other
countries do. This may be due to the relatively short
time period under study. The trend of government
expenditure seems to be contained within the growth of
GDP up to the present moment.
This study starts with a basic model of the
public-choice approach to analyze the growth of 'the
public sector. The growth of relative government size
over. GDP is postulated to be dependent on per-capita GDP,
population, and the marginal unit price of public
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service. This is continued with a subsequent extension of
the model to studv the influence of interest groups,
bureaucratic strength and the visibility of tax system on
the growth of public sector. The reason for the
incorporation of several theories- into one model is that
there are no widely accepted paradigms upon which
specific hypothesis might be constructed and tested. 33
The major findings of this study are that, at
least in the Hong Kong experience, there is strong
evidence that an endogenous public sector will be
applicable to Hong Kong. No single explanatory theory
emerges full-blown from the analysis.
The income elasticity obtained by regressing
relative government share with per capita income alone
will be biased upwards. This would indicate that
government expenditure is not only affected by per capita
income, but may also be affected by other variables as
well.
The influence of the variables : PRICE (the
relative price of public to private goods) and TAXSH (the
tax share perceived) on relative government size are in
opposite directions. Nevertheless, by combining the two
variables together to form the TAXPC variable, the price
elasticity thus obtained exhibits inelastic price demand
for government expenditure.
By assuming the only function of government is
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redistribution, it implies that all government outputs
are private in nature. Hence, the crowding-out
parameter, which is the relationship between relative
government size and population after excluding the price
effect, is expected to be non-negative. The results
obtained indicated a positive crowding-out parameter
which is greater than unity. However, it cannot be
briefly concluded that all government expenditure in Hong
Kong are redistributive in nature, (although social
service expenditure, which is mainly redistributive in
nature, is continuously having an increasing share in
total government expenditure. This is because the
effect of population, as explained before, would be
dependent on several. economic and political factors in
the community. Perhaps identification of these factors
is necessary to isolate the impact of the variables on
government growth, but such a task would be beyond the
scope of this study.
Nevertheless, on the disaggregated expenditure
level, population clearly shows a negative relationship
with general service expenditure, but positive for the
other services, and having the largest value for social
service. This would indicate that government general
service in Hong Kong exhibits relatively more public good
nature, while social services are more private.
The consistently positive but somewhat weakly
significant contribution of the interest group variable
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is one thing which should not be easily ignored. it
shows that the effect of interest groups on government
size is independent of whether an interest group
influences its own tax rate or the direction of public
expenditure. The weakly significant influence of
interest groups on government expenditure may be due to
the fact that in Hong Kong, we do not have different
parties fighting for votes as in democratic countries.
Interest group preferences here cannot directly be
transformed into political decisions. The only way
through which interest group influences can be passed to
government is through the Legislative, Executive Council,
the Urban Council or the Regional Council. However, the
magnitude of influence on government size due to interest
groups as seen from the elasticity value do indicate
certain level of importance.
As Hong Kong approaches towards 1997, the
pressure in pressing the government to form a more
democratic public sector with more opportunities for
direct voting would increase. If direct voting can
finally be implemented, this would tend to upgrade the
influential power of interest groups.
Although the interest group variable is not
strongly significant in total government expenditure, it
is very significant in social service expenditure and its
influence is obviously large. This is because social
service is that category of expenditure which interest
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groups would be most eager to influence.
The theories underlying interest group
influence actually point to government redistributive
activities. But concerning the inclusion of the interest
group variable, no prediction is made about the direction
in which redistribution flows. Nevertheless, as more and
more organizations that cater for the interest of the
lower income groups have increased their influence in the
economy, for example, the Christian Industrial Council
which fights for better benefit for the industrial
workers, and the Hong Kong Council of Social Service
whic.h..plavs an important role in demanding for better
welfare services for the lower income groups, one might
posit poor-to-rich redistribution as the most likely
consequence of interest group influence.
This study also highlights an important factor
-- the role of bureaucracy on the growth of relative
public size. Results seem to indicate the desirability
of the bureaucrats for the expanding public payrolls.
However, it might also reflect the higher opportunity
cost of efficient work. It has been pointed out by Hsueh
(1983):
"Hong Kong as a free port badly needs an efficient public
sector to handle the local and external affairs. A
reasonable high pay to civil servants is a rational way
to raise productivity of the public sector."
To sum up, the following major points should be
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stressed. First, there is strong evidence that the
concept of an endogenous public sector will be applicable
to the Hong Kong case. Second, the common belief is that
in the absence of a voting system, the public's
preferences may not be fully recognized and reflected.
The Hong Kong experience indicates that this would not be
the case for the Colony. When different factors
affecting government expenditure growth are taken into
account, it has been shown that in general, variables
reflecting citizens' demand for government goods and
services, i.e. per capita real income, perceived marginal
price, population and interest group influence are more
significant in affecting government expenditure growth in
Hong Kong than variables relating to the self interests
of the government decision-making class, i.e. tax
visibility and bureaucratic strength.
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2. Consolidated Government. Revenue includes revenue from
General Revenue Account, total receipts from Urban
Council (and the Regional Council for 198687), total
income from the Housing Authority, and receipts from
Development. Loan Fund, Capital Works Reserve Fund,
Home Ownership Fund, Student. Loan Fund and the
Lotteries Fund.
3. Total Tax Revenue includes Direct Taxes, Indirect
Taxes as well as Non-tax Revenue. »
4. Direct. Taxes include Earnings and Profits Tax and
Estate Dut.v.
n.a. — Not available
For all revenue categories:
For 194647-196263: Ho, C.Y., The Fiscal System of
Hong Kong. op. cit., P.43, Table 2.10; For 196364-
198788: various issues of the followings
Government Secretariat, Estimates of Revenue and
Expenditure, Hong Kong Government Printer; Census and
Statistics Department., Hong Kong Annual digest of
Statistics, Hong Kong Government. Printer; Housing
Authority, Annual Report, Hong Kong Government
Printer; Urban Council, Annual Report, Hong Kong
Government. Printer; and the Accountant General, Annual
Departmental Repoi~t., Hong Kong Government Printer.















































































































































































Consumer Price Index : The general retail price index is
used for period 194748 to 196465; the general
consumer price index for 196566-197475; consumer
price index (A) for 197576-198788. The price
indices are monthly averages and are converted to the
same base period (Oct 1979 - Sept 1980 = 100) .
APPENDIX II. (Con't)
Notes :
GDP Deflator : Figures given here are in fiscal year
basis adjusted from calendar year based deflators by
assuming constant price throughout the year.
Deflators from various sources are converted to the
same base year (1980 = 100).
Government Price Deflator : Figures given here are in
fiscal year basis adjusted from calendar year based
deflators by assuming constant price throughout the
year. The price deflator used is the deflator for
government consumption expenditure and gross domestic
capital formation. Deflators from various sources are
converted to the same base vear (1980 = 100).
Sources :
Consumer Price Index :
For 194748-196566: Census and Statistics Department,
Hong Kong Statistics 1947-1967, Hong Kong Government
Priinter, P.144, Table 8.7; For 196566-198788: Census
and Statistics Department., Hong Kong Monthly Digest of
Statistics, Hong Kong Government Printer, various
issues.
GDP Deflator :
For 194748-196061: Ho, C.Y., The Fiscal System of
Hong Kong, op. cit.., P.169, Table SI; For 196162-
198788: Estimates of GDP, various issues.
Government Price Deflator :
For 194748-196061: Ho, C.Y., The Fiscal System of
Hong Kong, ibid., P.27, Table 2.3; For 196162-
198788: Estimates of GDP, various issues.
Provisional Estimates
Preliminary Estimates
n.a. — Not available





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































itte'ms (1), (2), (4), and (6) to (9) are given at
current, prices and adjusted to fiscal year basis.
Items (3) and (5) are given as total no. of persons
and item (5) is also given on fiscal year basis.
APPENDIX ITT (Con't)
2. Part, ot land sales revenue since 1 9 8 (- 8 7 i 5
transferred to a suspense account in the Capita!
Works Reserve Fund in accordance with the Joint
Declaration ot the governments ot U.K. and P.R.C.
3. Government, emoluments does not Include pensions.
n.a. -- Not available
Provisional Fstimat-ra
Sources of Data
1. Revenue from Land Sales : For 194950-196869, from
Ho, C.Y., The Fiscal System of Hong Kong, op. cit.., P 376,
Table S7 ; For 196979-198788, from Estimates of Revenue
and Expenditure, and Hong Kong Annual Digest of
Statistics, various issues.
2. Revenue from Stamp Duty : For 194748-196869, from
Wu, C.L., The Public Finance of Hong Kong in the Post-war
Period, M. Phil thesis, University of London, 1977, p.47,
Table 114 ; For 196970-198687, from Estimates of Revenue
and Expenditure, and -Hong Kong Annual Digest of
Statistics, various issues.
3. Total Mid-vear Population : For 194647, from Chow,
Steven, C.M., Economic Growth and Income Distribution in
Hong Kong, Michigan: University Microfilms International,
1981, P.236, Table 8.5: For 194748-196061, from Hong
Kong Statistics, 1947-1967, P.14, Table 2.2; For 196162-
198788, from Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics and
Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, various issues.
4. Government Consumption and Investment. Expenditure :
For 194950-196061, from Ho, C.Y., The Fiscal System of
Hong Kong, op. cit.., P.174, Table S6; For 196162-
198687, from Estimates of GDP, various issues.
5. Total Number of Interest. Groups : For 194950-195354,
from The Royal Hong Kong Police Force, Annual Review,
Hong Kong Government. Printer, and Labour Department.,
Annual Departmental Reports, Hong Kong Government
Printer, various issues; For 195455-198485, from The
Royal Hong Kong Police Force, Annual Review, and the
Registrv of Trade Unions, Annual Departmental Report,
Hong Kong Government. Printer, various issues.
6. Emoluments of Government. Employees : Various issues of
the followinqs — Estimates of Revenue and. Expenditure;
Public Service Commission, Report on the Civil Service,
Hong Kong Government. Printer, and Public Service




7. GDP at Factor Cost: For 1949/50-1960/61, from Chou,
K. R., The Hong Kong Economy: A Miracle of Growth, Hong
Kong: Academic Publications, 1966, P.83, Table 26, For
1961/62 onwards, from Estimates of GDP, various issues.
8. Total Exports of Goods: For 1946/47-1960/61, from
Chou K.R., ibid., P.40, Table 10 For 1961/62-1987/88,
from Estimates of GDP, various issues.
9. Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation: For 1948/49-
1960/61, from Ho, C .Y., The Fiscal System of Hong Kong,
op. cit., P.170, Table :2 for 1961/62-1987/88, from
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